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arXiv 1103.0342q-bio.PE
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具有社区结构的多层次公共物品博弈中的合作演化

Evolution of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures

Jing Wang, Bin Wu, Daniel W. C. Ho, Long Wang

摘要:

在社区结构的人口中,公共物品博弈(PGG)既发生在社区内部,也发生在社区之间。这种类型的PGG被称为多层次公共产品博弈(MPGG)。我们提出了一个最低限度的进化模型的MPGG和分析研究合作的演变。我们证明,在社区规模和社区数量足够大的情况下,如果社区内的模仿强度很弱,即,个体几乎随机地模仿同一社区中的另一个体,从长期来看,合作和惩罚比背叛更丰富;如果社区之间的模仿强度很强,即,来自不同群体的两个个体总是模仿更成功的策略,合作和惩罚也更丰富。然而,当两种模仿强度都很强时,背叛成为种群中最丰富的策略。我们的模型为当代社区公共社会困境中的大规模合作研究提供了新的视角。

英文摘要:

In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and analytically study the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that in the case of sufficiently large community size and community number, if the imitation strength within community is weak, i.e., an individual imitates another one in the same community almost randomly, cooperation as well as punishment are more abundant than defection in the long run; if the imitation strength between communities is strong, i.e., the more successful strategy in two individuals from distinct communities is always imitated, cooperation and punishment are also more abundant. However, when both of the two imitation intensities are strong, defection becomes the most abundant strategy in the population. Our model provides insight into the investigation of the large-scale cooperation in public social dilemma among contemporary communities.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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