群体结构种群中多水平选择PDE复制子方程的长时间行为
Long-Time Behavior of a PDE Replicator Equation for Multilevel Selection in Group-Structured Populations
摘要:
在许多生物系统中,自然选择同时作用于组织的多个层次。这种情况通常表现为个体欺骗动机与群体内建立合作的集体动机之间的进化冲突。推广以前的工作在演化博弈论中的多级选择,我们考虑一个双曲线PDE模型的组结构的人口,在一个单一的组内的成员相互竞争的个人水平的复制,而组也竞争对其他组的组水平的复制。我们得到一个阈值水平的相对强度组间竞争,使叛逃者接管人口低于阈值,而合作持续在长期人口高于阈值。在较强的假设下,组成分的初始分布,我们进一步证明了人口收敛到一个稳定的状态密度支持组间的选择强度高于阈值的合作。我们进一步建立了长期的时间上的时间平均的人口的集体收益的界限,表明长期运行的人口不能优于一个完整的合作者组的收益,即使在无限强的组间竞争的限制。当群体复制率通过中等水平的群体内合作而最大化时,个人层面的选择会给多层次选择的动态蒙上长长的阴影:任何水平的群体间竞争都无法消除个人叛逃动机的影响。我们进一步扩展我们的模型,研究多种类型的群体的情况下,显示如何的游戏,群体发挥可以共同进化的合作水平。
英文摘要:
In many biological systems, natural selection acts simultaneously on multiple levels of organization. This scenario typically presents an evolutionary conflict between the incentive of individuals to cheat and the collective incentive to establish cooperation within a group. Generalizing previous work on multilevel selection in evolutionary game theory, we consider a hyperbolic PDE model of a group-structured population, in which members within a single group compete with each other for individual-level replication; while the group also competes against other groups for group-level replication. We derive a threshold level of the relative strength of between-group competition such that defectors take over the population below the threshold while cooperation persists in the long-time population above the threshold. Under stronger assumptions on the initial distribution of group compositions, we further prove that the population converges to a steady state density supporting cooperation for between-group selection strength above the threshold. We further establish long-time bounds on the time-average of the collective payoff of the population, showing that the long-run population cannot outperform the payoff of a full-cooperator group even in the limit of infinitely-strong between-group competition. When the group replication rate is maximized by an intermediate level of within-group cooperation, individual-level selection casts a long shadow on the dynamics of multilevel selection: no level of between-group competition can erase the effects of the individual incentive to defect. We further extend our model to study the case of multiple types of groups, showing how the games that groups play can coevolve with the level of cooperation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。