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arXiv 1102.3341cs.MA
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社会选择函数的推理

Reasoning about Social Choice Functions

Nicolas Troquard, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge

摘要:

我们引入一个逻辑专门设计来支持推理社会选择功能。该逻辑包括运营商捕捉战略能力,运营商捕捉代理人的偏好。我们建立了逻辑公式与社会选择函数性质之间的对应关系,并证明了逻辑对于社会选择函数是表达完备的,即,每个社会选择函数都可以被描述为一个逻辑公式。证明了该逻辑是可判定的,并给出了一个完备的公理化。为了证明逻辑的价值,我们特别展示了它如何应用于确定社会选择函数是否是防策略的问题。

英文摘要:

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.

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