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arXiv 2103.03652cs.MA
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民主分叉:用社会选择选择立场

Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice

Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon

AI总结:

本文提出民主分叉的社会选择框架,让智能体同时表达对备选方案和潜在分叉的偏好,并研究其稳定性与策略性操纵问题。

摘要:

任何成员身份可自愿选择的共同体,最终都可能分裂,即发生分叉。例如,分叉可能出现在政党、商业伙伴关系、社会群体、加密货币和联邦治理机构中。分叉通常是非正式社会过程或心怀不满的少数派有组织行动的产物,并不总是友好的。分叉通常会带来代价,并且可被视为破坏共同体稳定的集体决策后果。在此,我们提出一种社会选择设定,其中智能体不仅可以报告对一组备选方案的偏好,还可以报告面对分歧时可能发生的各种分叉的偏好。我们研究这一社会选择设定,重点关注稳定性问题以及智能体策略性行为方面的担忧。

英文摘要:

Any community in which membership is optional may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, cryptocurrencies, and federated governing bodies. Forking is typically the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority, and it is not always amicable. Forks usually come at a cost, and can be seen as consequences of collective decisions that destabilize the community. Here, we provide a social choice setting in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study this social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues and concerns of strategic agent behavior.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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