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arXiv 1102.2837physics.soc-phcs.SI
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层级组织中的有效晋升策略

Efficient Promotion Strategies in Hierarchical Organizations

Alessandro Pluchino, Andrea Rapisarda, Cesare Garofalo

摘要:

彼得原则最近已被调查,通过基于代理的模拟和它的有效性已被数值证实。事实证明,在一定条件下,它确实会对采用精英晋升的金字塔型组织的效率产生负面影响。研究还发现,为了绕过这些影响,应采用替代性促销策略,例如随机选择。在本文中,在同一行的研究,我们研究推广策略,在一个更现实的层次和模块化的组织,我们显示了我们以前的结果的鲁棒性,将其有效性扩展到一个更一般的情况下。我们还讨论了为什么采用这些战略可能是有用的真正的组织。

英文摘要:

The Peter principle has been recently investigated by means of an agent-based simulation and its validity has been numerically corroborated. It has been confirmed that, within certain conditions, it can really influence in a negative way the efficiency of a pyramidal organization adopting meritocratic promotions. It was also found that, in order to bypass these effects, alternative promotion strategies should be adopted, as for example a random selection choice. In this paper, within the same line of research, we study promotion strategies in a more realistic hierarchical and modular organization and we show the robustness of our previous results, extending their validity to a more general context. We discuss also why the adoption of these strategies could be useful for real organizations.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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