彼得原理的计算研究
The Peter Principle Revisited: A Computational Study
摘要：
60年代末，加拿大心理学家劳伦斯·J·彼得提出了一个明显自相矛盾的原则，从那时起以他的名字命名，可以概括如下：{ \it“层级组织中的每一个新成员都会爬上层级，直到他/她达到他/她的最大无能水平”}。尽管这一原则显然不合理，但在任何组织中，如果晋升机制奖励的是最优秀的成员，而且等级结构中新一级的晋升机制并不取决于他们在上一级的能力，通常是因为各级的任务彼此非常不同，那么这一原则就可以切实地发挥作用。在这里，我们表明，通过基于代理的模拟，如果后两个功能实际上在一个给定的模型中的组织与层次结构，那么不仅是彼得原则是不可避免的，而且它反过来又产生了显着减少的全球效率的组织。在一个类似博弈论的方法，我们探索不同的推广策略，我们发现，违反直觉，为了避免这种影响，提高效率的最佳途径，一个给定的组织要么促进每次代理随机或随机促进最好的和最差的成员的能力。
英文摘要：
In the late sixties the Canadian psychologist Laurence J. Peter advanced an apparently paradoxical principle, named since then after him, which can be summarized as follows: {\it 'Every new member in a hierarchical organization climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches his/her level of maximum incompetence'}. Despite its apparent unreasonableness, such a principle would realistically act in any organization where the mechanism of promotion rewards the best members and where the mechanism at their new level in the hierarchical structure does not depend on the competence they had at the previous level, usually because the tasks of the levels are very different to each other. Here we show, by means of agent based simulations, that if the latter two features actually hold in a given model of an organization with a hierarchical structure, then not only is the Peter principle unavoidable, but also it yields in turn a significant reduction of the global efficiency of the organization. Within a game theory-like approach, we explore different promotion strategies and we find, counterintuitively, that in order to avoid such an effect the best ways for improving the efficiency of a given organization are either to promote each time an agent at random or to promote randomly the best and the worst members in terms of competence.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
