一个基于优化的自动营销框架
An Optimization-Based Framework for Automated Market-Making
摘要:
从在线凸优化的思想的基础上,我们提出了一个通用的框架,有效的证券市场的设计非常大的结果空间。这里的挑战是计算。在一个完全的市场中,每一种结果都提供一种证券,当结果空间很大时,市场机构无法有效地跟踪交易历史或计算证券价格。自然的解决方案是将证券的空间限制在比结果空间小得多的范围内,这样证券就可以有效地定价。最近的研究集中在寻找可以通过为完整市场设计的现有机制有效定价的证券空间。虽然已经取得了一些成功,但大部分研究都导致了硬度结果。在本文中,我们采取了一种完全不同的方法。我们从一个任意的有界收益的证券空间开始,并建立一个框架来设计适合这个空间的市场。我们证明了任何满足一组直观条件的市场都必须通过凸势函数对证券进行定价,并且可达价格空间必须恰好是证券收益的凸包。然后,我们展示了如何凸势函数可以定义在安全支付的凸包的优化方面。最优化问题的最优解给出了证券价格。使用这个框架,我们提供了一个有效的市场,预测一个物体在一个球体上的着陆位置。此外,我们表明,我们可以放松我们的“无套利”条件,设计一个新的有效的做市商配对投注,这是已知的#P-难以使用现有的机制定价。这一放宽还允许做市商收取交易费用,以便市场深度可以随着交易数量的增加而动态增加。
英文摘要:
Building on ideas from online convex optimization, we propose a general framework for the design of efficient securities markets over very large outcome spaces. The challenge here is computational. In a complete market, in which one security is offered for each outcome, the market institution can not efficiently keep track of the transaction history or calculate security prices when the outcome space is large. The natural solution is to restrict the space of securities to be much smaller than the outcome space in such a way that securities can be priced efficiently. Recent research has focused on searching for spaces of securities that can be priced efficiently by existing mechanisms designed for complete markets. While there have been some successes, much of this research has led to hardness results. In this paper, we take a drastically different approach. We start with an arbitrary space of securities with bounded payoff, and establish a framework to design markets tailored to this space. We prove that any market satisfying a set of intuitive conditions must price securities via a convex potential function and that the space of reachable prices must be precisely the convex hull of the security payoffs. We then show how the convex potential function can be defined in terms of an optimization over the convex hull of the security payoffs. The optimal solution to the optimization problem gives the security prices. Using this framework, we provide an efficient market for predicting the landing location of an object on a sphere. In addition, we show that we can relax our "no-arbitrage" condition to design a new efficient market maker for pair betting, which is known to be #P-hard to price using existing mechanisms. This relaxation also allows the market maker to charge transaction fees so that the depth of the market can be dynamically increased as the number of trades increases.
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