am-AMM：拍卖管理的自动做市商
am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker
AI总结：
本文针对AMMs减少知情订单流损失与最大化非知情订单流收益的问题，提出拍卖管理AMM机制，通过链上拍卖选临时池管理者设定费率并获收益，最终提升流动性提供者收益与池流动性。
摘要：
自动做市商（AMMs）已成为区块链去中心化交易所交易的主导市场机制。本文提出一种单一机制，旨在解决AMMs的两个重要未解决问题：减少知情订单流带来的损失，以及最大化非知情订单流的收益。“拍卖管理AMM”通过运行抗审查的链上拍卖，授予中标者临时担任恒定乘积AMM“池管理者”的权利。池管理者设定池的swap费率，并收取swap产生的累计费用。池管理者可通过针对小幅价格变动与池交易来独家捕获部分套利机会，还可结合零售订单流的价格敏感性设定swap费率并适应市场条件变化，两者的收益最终归流动性提供者所有。流动性提供者可根据租金变化自由进出池，但提款需支付少量费用。我们证明，在特定假设下，该AMM在均衡状态下的流动性应高于任何标准固定费率AMM。
英文摘要：
Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The ``auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as ``pool manager'' for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
