We study the problem of ranking with submodular valuations. An instance of this problem consists of a ground set $[m]$, and a collection of $n$ monotone submodular set functions $f^1, \ldots, f^n$, where each $f^i: 2^{[m]} \to R_+$. An additional ingredient of the input is a weight vector $w \in R_+^n$. The objective is to find a linear ordering of the ground set elements that minimizes the weighted cover time of the functions. The cover time of a function is the minimal number of elements in the prefix of the linear ordering that form a set whose corresponding function value is greater than a unit threshold value.
Our main contribution is an $O(\ln(1 / ε))$-approximation algorithm for the problem, where $ε$ is the smallest non-zero marginal value that any function may gain from some element. Our algorithm orders the elements using an adaptive residual updates scheme, which may be of independent interest. We also prove that the problem is $Ω(\ln(1 / ε))$-hard to approximate, unless P = NP. This implies that the outcome of our algorithm is optimal up to constant factors.
We present a $380$-approximation algorithm for the Nash Social Welfare problem with submodular valuations. Our algorithm builds on and extends a recent constant-factor approximation for Rado valuations.
We show that for any constant $ε> 0$ and $p \ge 1$, it is possible to distinguish functions $f : \{0,1\}^n \to [0,1]$ that are submodular from those that are $ε$-far from every submodular function in $\ell_p$ distance with a constant number of queries. More generally, we extend the testing-by-implicit-learning framework of Diakonikolas et al. (2007) to show that every property of real-valued functions that is well-approximated in $\ell_2$ distance by a class of $k$-juntas for some $k = O(1)$ can be tested in the $\ell_p$-testing model with a constant number of queries. This result, combined wi…
We prove that no online algorithm (even randomized, against an oblivious adversary) is better than 1/2-competitive for welfare maximization with coverage valuations, unless $NP = RP$. Since the Greedy algorithm is known to be 1/2-competitive for monotone submodular valuations, of which coverage is a special case, this proves that Greedy provides the optimal competitive ratio. On the other hand, we prove that Greedy in a stochastic setting with i.i.d.items and valuations satisfying diminishing returns is $(1-1/e)$-competitive, which is optimal even for coverage valuations, unless $NP=RP$. For o…
We present a new type of monotone submodular functions: \emph{multi-peak submodular functions}. Roughly speaking, given a family of sets $\cF$, we construct a monotone submodular function $f$ with a high value $f(S)$ for every set $S \in {\cF}$ (a "peak"), and a low value on every set that does not intersect significantly any set in $\cF$. We use this construction to show that a better than $(1-\frac{1}{2e})$-approximation ($\simeq 0.816$) for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations is (1) impossible in the communication model, (2) NP-hard in the computational…
We study the matroid secretary problems with submodular valuation functions. In these problems, the elements arrive in random order. When one element arrives, we have to make an immediate and irrevocable decision on whether to accept it or not. The set of accepted elements must form an {\em independent set} in a predefined matroid. Our objective is to maximize the value of the accepted elements. In this paper, we focus on the case that the valuation function is a non-negative and monotonically non-decreasing submodular function. We introduce a general algorithm for such {\em submodular matroid…
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like) valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approximation algorithm with factor independent of m i…
Maximizing submodular functions have been studied extensively for a wide range of subset-selection problems. However, much less attention has been given to the role of submodularity in sequence-selection and ranking problems. A recently-introduced framework, named \emph{maximum submodular ranking} (MSR), tackles a family of ranking problems that arise naturally when resources are shared among multiple demands with different budgets. For example, the MSR framework can be used to rank web pages for multiple user intents. In this paper, we extend the MSR framework in the streaming setting. In par…
In the submodular ranking (SR) problem, the input consists of a set of submodular functions defined on a ground set of elements. The goal is to order elements for all the functions to have value above a certain threshold as soon on average as possible, assuming we choose one element per time. The problem is flexible enough to capture various applications in machine learning, including decision trees. This paper considers the min-max version of SR where multiple instances share the ground set. With the view of each instance being associated with an agent, the min-max problem is to order the com…
The classical problem of maximizing a submodular function under a matroid constraint is considered. Defining a new measure for the increments made by the greedy algorithm at each step, called the discriminant, improved approximation ratio guarantees are derived for the greedy algorithm. At each step, discriminant measures the multiplicative gap in the incremental valuation between the item chosen by the greedy algorithm and the largest potential incremental valuation for eligible items not selected by it. The new guarantee subsumes all the previous known results for the greedy algorithm, inclu…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to sell his items for the highest possible prices, and each buyer wants to maximize his utility (i.e., valuation minus payment) as long as his payment does not exceed his budget. The optimal pricing problem seeks a price of each item and an assignment of items to buyers such that every buyer achieves the maximum utility under the prices. The goal of the problem…
KTH Royal Institute of Technology（KTH皇家理工学院）；HIIT（赫尔辛基信息技术研究所）；University of Helsinki（赫尔辛基大学）
Submodular maximization has been the backbone of many important machine-learning problems, and has applications to viral marketing, diversification, sensor placement, and more. However, the study of maximizing submodular functions has mainly been restricted in the context of selecting a set of items. On the other hand, many real-world applications require a solution that is a ranking over a set of items. The problem of ranking in the context of submodular function maximization has been considered before, but to a much lesser extent than item-selection formulations. In this paper, we explore a …
A Counterexample to EFX $n \ge 3$ Agents, $m \ge n + 5$ Items, Submodular Valuations via SAT-Solving
Max Planck Institute for Informatics（马克斯·普朗克信息学研究所）；Saarland Informatics Campus（萨尔兰信息学校园）；University of Bonn（波恩大学）；Hertz Chair for Algorithms and Optimization（赫茨算法与优化讲席）；Saarbrücken Graduate School for Computer Science（萨尔布吕肯计算机科学研究生院）；CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security（CISPA赫尔霍兹信息安全中心）
The submodular Santa Claus problem was introduced in a seminal work by Goemans, Harvey, Iwata, and Mirrokni (SODA'09) as an application of their structural result. In the mentioned problem $n$ unsplittable resources have to be assigned to $m$ players, each with a monotone submodular utility function $f_i$. The goal is to maximize $\min_i f_i(S_i)$ where $S_1,\dotsc,S_m$ is a partition of the resources. The result by Goemans et al. implies a polynomial time $O(n^{1/2 +\varepsilon})$-approximation algorithm. Since then progress on this problem was limited to the linear case, that is, all $f_i$ a…
University of Michigan（密歇根大学）；Bloomberg LP（彭博有限合伙公司）
We study a general stochastic ranking problem where an algorithm needs to adaptively select a sequence of elements so as to "cover" a random scenario (drawn from a known distribution) at minimum expected cost. The coverage of each scenario is captured by an individual submodular function, where the scenario is said to be covered when its function value goes above a given threshold. We obtain a logarithmic factor approximation algorithm for this adaptive ranking problem, which is the best possible (unless P=NP). This problem unifies and generalizes many previously studied problems with applicat…
In the Submodular Welfare Maximization (SWM) problem, the input consists of a set of $n$ items, each of which must be allocated to one of $m$ agents. Each agent $\ell$ has a valuation function $v_\ell$, where $v_\ell(S)$ denotes the welfare obtained by this agent if she receives the set of items $S$. The functions $v_\ell$ are all submodular; as is standard, we assume that they are monotone and $v_\ell(\emptyset) = 0$. The goal is to partition the items into $m$ disjoint subsets $S_1, S_2, \ldots S_m$ in order to maximize the social welfare, defined as $\sum_{\ell = 1}^m v_\ell(S_\ell)$. In th…
Prophet inequalities and secretary problems have been extensively studied in recent years due to their elegance, connections to online algorithms, stochastic optimization, and mechanism design problems in game theoretic settings. Rubinstein and Singla developed a notion of combinatorial prophet inequalities in order to generalize the standard prophet inequality setting to combinatorial valuation functions such as submodular and subadditive functions. For non-negative submodular functions they demonstrated a constant factor prophet inequality for matroid constraints. Along the way they showed a…
We study truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks. In this scenario, n communication requests need to be allocated to k available channels that are subject to interference and noise. We present the first truthful mechanisms for secondary spectrum auctions with symmetric or submodular valuations. Our approach to model interference uses an edge-weighted conflict graph, and our algorithms provide asymptotically almost optimal approximation bounds for conflict graphs with a small inductive independence number rho << n. This approach covers a large variety of interference…
We study the Minimum Latency Submodular Cover problem (MLSC), which consists of a metric $(V,d)$ with source $r\in V$ and $m$ monotone submodular functions $f_1, f_2, ..., f_m: 2^V \rightarrow [0,1]$. The goal is to find a path originating at $r$ that minimizes the total cover time of all functions. This generalizes well-studied problems, such as Submodular Ranking [AzarG11] and Group Steiner Tree [GKR00]. We give a polynomial time $O(\log \frac{1}{\eps} \cdot \log^{2+δ} |V|)$-approximation algorithm for MLSC, where $ε>0$ is the smallest non-zero marginal increase of any $\{f_i\}_{i=1}^m$ and …
We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation functions. For a (non-monotone) submodular objective function over an arbitrary matroid feasibility constraint, we give an $O(1)$-competitive algorithm. For a monotone subadditive objective function over an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint, we give an $O(\log n \log^2 r)$-competitive algorithm (where $r$ is the cardinality of the largest feasible subset). Inspired by the proof of our subadditive prophet inequality, we also obtain an $O(\log n \cdot \log^2 r)$-competitive algorithm for the Secreta…
We study a submodular maximization problem motivated by applications in online retail. A platform displays a list of products to a user in response to a search query. The user inspects the first $k$ items in the list for a $k$ chosen at random from a given distribution, and decides whether to purchase an item from that set based on a choice model. The goal of the platform is to maximize the engagement of the shopper defined as the probability of purchase. This problem gives rise to a less-studied variation of submodular maximization in which we are asked to choose an $\textit{ordering}$ of a s…
Approximating Nash Social Welfare by Matching and Local Search
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign（伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校）；IDSIA, USI-SUPSI（瑞士提契诺大学/应用信息学院）；Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；University of Bonn（波恩大学）；London School of Economics and Political Science（伦敦政治经济学院）
We study the problem of constructing a linear sketch of minimum dimension that allows approximation of a given real-valued function $f \colon \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb R$ with small expected squared error. We develop a general theory of linear sketching for such functions through which we analyze their dimension for most commonly studied types of valuation functions: additive, budget-additive, coverage, $α$-Lipschitz submodular and matroid rank functions. This gives a characterization of how many bits of information have to be stored about the input $x$ so that one can compute $f$ und…
In this paper we study the approximate learnability of valuations commonly used throughout economics and game theory for the quantitative encoding of agent preferences. We provide upper and lower bounds regarding the learnability of important subclasses of valuation functions that express no-complementarities. Our main results concern their approximate learnability in the distributional learning (PAC-style) setting. We provide nearly tight lower and upper bounds of $\tildeΘ(n^{1/2})$ on the approximation factor for learning XOS and subadditive valuations, both widely studied superclasses of su…
We present fast algorithms for sketching valuation functions. Let $N$ ($|N|=n$) be some ground set and $v:2^N\rightarrow \mathbb R$ be a function. We say that $\tilde v:2^N\rightarrow \mathbb R$ is an $α$-sketch of $v$ if for every set $S$ we have that $\frac {v(S)} α \leq \tilde v(S) \leq v(S)$ and $\tilde v$ can be described in $poly(n)$ bits. Goemans et al. [SODA'09] showed that if $v$ is submodular then there exists an $\tilde O(\sqrt n)$-sketch that can be constructed using polynomially many value queries (this is the best possible, as Balcan and Harvey [STOC'11] show that no submodular f…
Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）；California Institute of Technology（加州理工学院）；Google, Inc.（谷歌公司）
Which ads should we display in sponsored search in order to maximize our revenue? How should we dynamically rank information sources to maximize value of information? These applications exhibit strong diminishing returns: Selection of redundant ads and information sources decreases their marginal utility. We show that these and other problems can be formalized as repeatedly selecting an assignment of items to positions to maximize a sequence of monotone submodular functions that arrive one by one. We present an efficient algorithm for this general problem and analyze it in the no-regret model.…
Several large-scale machine learning tasks, such as data summarization, can be approached by maximizing functions that satisfy submodularity. These optimization problems often involve complex side constraints, imposed by the underlying application. In this paper, we develop an algorithm with poly-logarithmic adaptivity for non-monotone submodular maximization under general side constraints. The adaptive complexity of a problem is the minimal number of sequential rounds required to achieve the objective. Our algorithm is suitable to maximize a non-monotone submodular function under a $p$-system…
Stochastic Boolean Function Evaluation is the problem of determining the value of a given Boolean function f on an unknown input x, when each bit of x_i of x can only be determined by paying an associated cost c_i. The assumption is that x is drawn from a given product distribution, and the goal is to minimize the expected cost. This problem has been studied in Operations Research, where it is known as "sequential testing" of Boolean functions. It has also been studied in learning theory in the context of learning with attribute costs. We consider the general problem of developing approximatio…
We consider the following document ranking problem: We have a collection of documents, each containing some topics (e.g. sports, politics, economics). We also have a set of users with diverse interests. Assume that user u is interested in a subset I_u of topics. Each user u is also associated with a positive integer K_u, which indicates that u can be satisfied by any K_u topics in I_u. Each document s contains information for a subset C_s of topics. The objective is to pick one document at a time such that the average satisfying time is minimized, where a user's satisfying time is the first ti…
We consider the single-item interdependent value setting, where there is a monopolist, $n$ buyers, and each buyer has a private signal $s_i$ describing a piece of information about the item. Each bidder $i$ also has a valuation function $v_i(s_1,\ldots,s_n)$ mapping the (private) signals of all buyers to a positive real number representing their value for the item. This setting captures scenarios where the item's information is asymmetric or dispersed among agents, such as in competitions for oil drilling rights, or in auctions for art pieces. Due to the increased complexity of this model comp…
In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility they obtain from any subset of the items. Our focus is specifically on welfare maximization, where the objective is to maximize the sum of valuations that the bidders place on the items that they were allocated (the valuation functions are assumed to be reported truthfully). We analyze an online problem in which the algorithm is not given the set of bidders in advance. Instead, the bidders are revealed sequentially i…
Single-or-Sample: Online Fair Allocation for Combinatorial Agents
University of Texas, Austin（德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校）；University of Chicago（芝加哥大学）；University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign（伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校）；University of California, Irvine（加州大学尔湾分校）
We introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions, that we refer to as $\mathcal{MPH}$ (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs). Levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity in a given function. The highest level of the hierarchy, $\mathcal{MPH}$-$m$ (where $m$ is the total number of items) captures all monotone functions. The lowest level, $\mathcal{MPH}$-$1$, captures all monotone submodular functions, and more generally, the class of functions known as $\mathcal{XOS}$. Every monotone function that has a positive hypergraph representation of rank $k$ (in the sense de…
We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation …
We study \emph{combinatorial procurement auctions}, where a buyer with a valuation function $v$ and budget $B$ wishes to buy a set of items. Each item $i$ has a cost $c_i$ and the buyer is interested in a set $S$ that maximizes $v(S)$ subject to $Σ_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$. Special cases of combinatorial procurement auctions are classical problems from submodular optimization. In particular, when the costs are all equal (\emph{cardinality constraint}), a classic result by Nemhauser et al shows that the greedy algorithm provides an $\frac e {e-1}$ approximation. Motivated by many papers that utilize …
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this problem, the existing literature on matching with externalities permits agents to provide complete and total rankings over matchings based off of both their own and their affiliates' matches. This complete ordering restriction is unrealistic, and further the model may have an empty core. To address this, we introduce the Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching (DA…
