arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1005.0087cs.CR
收藏

一种新的收缩生成器攻击策略

New Attack Strategy for the Shrinking Generator

Pino Caballero-Gil, Amparo Fúster-Sabater, M. Eugenia Pazo-Robles

摘要:

这项工作表明,收缩生成器的密码分析需要更少的拦截位比所指示的线性复杂度。实际上,尽管收缩序列的线性复杂度在$A \cdot 2^(S-2)$和$A \cdot 2^(S-1)$之间,但我们声称,两个分量寄存器的初始状态都可以用少于$A \cdot S$的收缩位轻松计算。由于将收缩序列定义为交织序列,证明了这样的结果。因此,它是明确的,这一说法可以扩展到所有的交织序列。此外,本文证实了交织序列的某些比特比其他比特具有更大的战略重要性,这可以被认为是交织生成器的弱点的证明。

英文摘要:

This work shows that the cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator requires fewer intercepted bits than what indicated by the linear complexity. Indeed, whereas the linear complexity of shrunken sequences is between $A \cdot 2^(S-2)$ and $A \cdot 2^(S-1)$, we claim that the initial states of both component registers are easily computed with less than $A \cdot S$ shrunken bits. Such a result is proven thanks to the definition of shrunken sequences as interleaved sequences. Consequently, it is conjectured that this statement can be extended to all interleaved sequences. Furthermore, this paper confirms that certain bits of the interleaved sequences have a greater strategic importance than others, which may be considered as a proof of weakness of interleaved generators.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑