动态贝特朗寡占
Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly
摘要:
我们研究连续时间贝特朗寡头垄断,其中少数公司生产类似的产品,通过制定价格相互竞争。我们首先分析了这个游戏的静态版本,以便更好地理解在动态设置中的策略。在静态博弈中,我们描述了纳什均衡时,有$N$球员异质成本。在市场需求不确定的动态博弈中,不同规模的企业具有不同的生命周期能力,这些能力根据市场对其产品的需求而随着时间的推移而消耗。在线性需求函数的情况下,建立了非零和随机微分对策及其相应的HJB偏微分方程系统。我们的某些定性特征的游戏使用的渐近近似在小竞争的限制。博弈的均衡进一步研究使用数值解。我们发现,当一个市场的结构是由许多相同的相对规模的公司生产高度可替代的商品时,消费者受益最大。然而,很大程度的可替代性并不总是导致价格的大幅下降,例如,当两个公司的规模相差很大时。
英文摘要:
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are $N$ players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic game with uncertain market demand, firms of different sizes have different lifetime capacities which deplete over time according to the market demand for their good. We setup the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game and its associated system of HJB partial differential equations in the case of linear demand functions. We characterize certain qualitative features of the game using an asymptotic approximation in the limit of small competition. The equilibrium of the game is further studied using numerical solutions. We find that consumers benefit the most when a market is structured with many firms of the same relative size producing highly substitutable goods. However, a large degree of substitutability does not always lead to large drops in price, for example when two firms have a large difference in their size.
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