严格劣势策略的分布式迭代消去
Distributed iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
摘要：
我们描述了在博弈论环境中理性代理人之间真实沟通的认知后果。为此，我们介绍了正常形式的游戏配备了一个互动结构，它指定哪些组的球员可以相互交流他们的喜好。然后，我们专注于一种特定形式的互动，即分布式形式的迭代消除严格劣势策略（IESDS），由代理之间的通信驱动。我们研究的结果后，IESDS的一些（可能是所有）关于玩家的喜好的消息已经发送。本文的主要结果提供了一个认识的理由，这种形式的IESDS。
英文摘要：
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players can communicate their preferences with each other. We then focus on a specific form of interaction, namely a distributed form of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), driven by communication among the agents. We study the outcome of IESDS after some (possibly all) messages about players' preferences have been sent. The main result of the paper provides an epistemic justification of this form of IESDS.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
