arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2501.17685econ.THcs.GT
收藏

无限博弈中严格占优策略的嵌套消除

Nested Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Infinite Games

University of Helsinki(赫尔辛基大学);Helsinki Graduate School of Economics(赫尔辛基经济学研究生院)

Michele Crescenzi

AI总结:

比较两种迭代消除严格占优策略的程序,给出两者等价的充要条件,还表明在拟超模博弈等中二者等价,并举例说明嵌套程序虽顺序独立但不等同于通用程序。

摘要:

我们比较了两种迭代消除严格占优策略的程序。在嵌套程序中,玩家的策略只有在被未消除的策略占优时才会被消除。通用程序更全面,因为它允许消除被先前消除的策略占优的策略。在有限博弈类之外,这两种程序可能会导致不同的结果,因为通用程序总是顺序独立的,而另一种则不是。我们提供了两种程序等价的充要条件。我们给出的条件基于策略配置文件的完全有界子集,这些子集是来自完全实施文献的有界机制的变体。这两种消除程序在拟超模博弈以及具有紧凑策略空间和上半连续收益函数的博弈中也被证明是等价的。最后,我们给出了一个博弈的例子,其中嵌套程序是顺序独立的,但不等同于通用程序,从而表明顺序独立不足以保证两种消除程序的等价性。

英文摘要:

We compare two procedures for the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. In the nested procedure, a strategy of a player is removed only if it is dominated by an unremoved strategy. The universal procedure is more comprehensive for it allows the removal of strategies that are dominated by previously removed ones. Outside the class of finite games, the two procedures may lead to different outcomes in that the universal one is always order independent while the other is not. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the equivalence of the two procedures. The conditions we give are based on completely bounded subsets of strategy profiles, which are variations of the bounded mechanisms from the literature on full implementation. The two elimination procedures are also shown to be equivalent in quasisupermodular games as well as in games with compact strategy spaces and upper semicontinuous payoff functions. Finally, we give an example of a game in which the nested procedure is order independent but not equivalent to the universal one, thus showing that order independence is not sufficient to guarantee the equivalence of the two elimination procedures.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑