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arXiv 0906.0237cs.CR
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功率分析攻击中的多重线性密码分析MLPA

Multi-Linear cryptanalysis in Power Analysis Attacks MLPA

Thomas Roche, Cédric Tavernier

摘要:

自1998年Paul Kocher,Joshua Ja和Benjamin Jun的论文中引入差分功耗分析以来,针对嵌入式秘密密钥密码系统的功耗分析攻击得到了广泛的研究。《达尔富尔和平协议》的力量如此之大,以至于有必要制定合理有效的对策。现在嵌入式密码原语通常集成这些对策中的一个或几个(例如,掩蔽技术、异步设计、平衡动态双轨门设计、噪声添加、功耗平滑等)。本文提出了一种简单但有趣的DPA和HO-DPA攻击对策,称为残酷对策和使用多线性近似的新功率分析攻击(MLPA攻击),基于Tavernier等人最近尚未发表的结果。

英文摘要:

Power analysis attacks against embedded secret key cryptosystems are widely studied since the seminal paper of Paul Kocher, Joshua Ja, and Benjamin Jun in 1998 where has been introduced the powerful Differential Power Analysis. The strength of DPA is such that it became necessary to develop sound and efficient countermeasures. Nowadays embedded cryptographic primitives usually integrate one or several of these countermeasures (e.g. masking techniques, asynchronous designs, balanced dynamic dual-rail gates designs, noise adding, power consumption smoothing, etc. ...). This document presents a simple, yet interesting, countermeasure to DPA and HO-DPA attacks, called brutal countermeasure and new power analysis attacks using multi-linear approximations (MLPA attacks) based on very recent and still unpublished results of Tavernier et al..

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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