arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2011.08326cs.CR
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一个基于代码的全时签名的密码分析

Cryptanalysis of a code-based full-time signature

Nicolas Aragon, Marco Baldi, Jean-Christophe Deneuville, Karan Khathuria, Edoardo Persichetti, Paolo Santini

摘要:

我们提出了一个攻击的代码为基础的签名方案的基础上Lyubashevsky协议,最近提出的宋,黄,穆,吴和王(SHMWW)。SHMWW方案中的私钥包含部分来自单位矩阵和部分来自随机矩阵的列。两种类型的列的存在导致在所产生的签名中的集合位的分布中的强偏差。我们的攻击利用了这样的偏见,从一堆收集的签名中恢复私钥。我们提供了一个理论分析的攻击,随着实验评估,我们表明,只要10个签名就足以成功地恢复私钥收集。至于以前的尝试,适应Lyubashevsky的协议的情况下,基于代码的密码,SHMWW计划,从而证明无法提供可接受的安全性。这证实了设计安全的基于代码的签名方案的效率与其他后量子解决方案(例如,基于晶格)仍然是一个具有挑战性的任务。

英文摘要:

We present an attack against a code-based signature scheme based on the Lyubashevsky protocol that was recently proposed by Song, Huang, Mu, Wu and Wang (SHMWW). The private key in the SHMWW scheme contains columns coming in part from an identity matrix and in part from a random matrix. The existence of two types of columns leads to a strong bias in the distribution of set bits in produced signatures. Our attack exploits such a bias to recover the private key from a bunch of collected signatures. We provide a theoretical analysis of the attack along with experimental evaluations, and we show that as few as 10 signatures are enough to be collected for successfully recovering the private key. As for previous attempts of adapting Lyubashevsky's protocol to the case of code-based cryptography, the SHMWW scheme is thus proved unable to provide acceptable security. This confirms that devising secure code-based signature schemes with efficiency comparable to that of other post-quantum solutions (e.g., based on lattices) is still a challenging task.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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