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arXiv 1812.03286cs.CRcs.ITmath.IT
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一个基于一次性码的数字签名方案的密码学分析

Cryptanalysis of a One-Time Code-Based Digital Signature Scheme

Paolo Santini, Marco Baldi, Franco Chiaraluce

摘要:

我们考虑一个一次性的数字签名计划最近提出的Reichetti和表明,一个成功的密钥恢复攻击可以安装有限的复杂性。我们提出的攻击利用了攻击者截获的单个签名,并依赖于对这样的签名进行的统计分析,然后进行信息集解码。我们评估的攻击的复杂性,并表明,完全恢复的秘密密钥可以执行的工作因素是远远低于声称的安全级别。攻击的效率是由签名的稀疏性所激发的,这导致关于秘密密钥的显著信息泄漏。

英文摘要:

We consider a one-time digital signature scheme recently proposed by Persichetti and show that a successful key recovery attack can be mounted with limited complexity. The attack we propose exploits a single signature intercepted by the attacker, and relies on a statistical analysis performed over such a signature, followed by information set decoding. We assess the attack complexity and show that a full recovery of the secret key can be performed with a work factor that is far below the claimed security level. The efficiency of the attack is motivated by the sparsity of the signature, which leads to a significant information leakage about the secret key.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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