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arXiv 0903.4460quant-ph
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与设备无关的量子密钥分发可防止集体攻击

Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks

Stefano Pironio, Antonio Acin, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin, Serge Massar, Valerio Scarani

摘要:

设备无关的量子密钥分发(DIQKD)是对通常的量子密钥分发(QKD)安全性假设的放松。与通常的QKD一样,DIQKD的安全性遵循量子物理定律,但与通常的QKD相反,它不依赖于协议中使用的量子设备的内部工作的任何假设。我们在这里详细介绍了[Phys. Rev. Lett. 98,230501(2008)]。这个证明利用了量子理论的完整结构(与其他仅利用无信号原理的证明相反),但仅再次保持集体攻击,其中假设窃听者在协议的每一轮独立且相同地作用于诚实方的量子系统(尽管她可以在任何时候一致地作用于她的系统)。任何DIQKD协议的安全性都必须依赖于违反贝尔不等式。我们讨论的问题,在贝尔实验中的漏洞在这方面。

英文摘要:

Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. We present here in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2008)]. This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit the no-signalling principle only), but only holds again collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically at each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.

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