arXiv 0902.44512009-02-25physics.soc-ph

To cooperate or to defect? Altruism and reputation

Krzysztof Kulakowski, Przemyslaw Gawronski

备注：: 7 pages, 4 figures
发表信息：: Physica A 388 (2009) 3581
DOI：: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.05.001

英文摘要：

The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's reputation. We find that players with positive altruism cooperate and met cooperation. In this approach, payoffs are not relevant. The mechanism is most efficient in the fully connected network.

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