arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 0806.1931cs.CR
收藏

没有诚实多数的信息论安全投票

Information-Theoretically Secure Voting Without an Honest Majority

Anne Broadbent, Alain Tapp

摘要:

我们提出了三个投票协议,无条件的隐私和信息理论的正确性,不假设任何约束的腐败选民或投票当局的数量。所有协议都具有多项式复杂性,并且需要专用信道和同步广播信道。我们的第一个协议是一个基本的投票方案,它允许选民进行交互,以计算计票。投票的隐私是无条件的,但是任何投票者都可以导致协议失败,在这种情况下,关于计票的信息仍然可能泄露。我们的第二个协议引入了投票当局,允许执行第一个协议,同时减少互动,并将其限制在选民和当局之间以及当局本身之间。同时广播也仅限于当局。只要一个权威是诚实的,隐私是无条件的,然而,一个腐败的权威或一个腐败的选民可以导致协议失败。我们的最终协议通过启用验证技术来允许当局撤销不正确的投票,从而提供了对腐败选民的保障。我们还讨论了使用临时计算假设的同时广播信道的实现,产生我们的协议实现永久安全的版本。

英文摘要:

We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and information-theoretic correctness, without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt voters or voting authorities. All protocols have polynomial complexity and require private channels and a simultaneous broadcast channel. Our first protocol is a basic voting scheme which allows voters to interact in order to compute the tally. Privacy of the ballot is unconditional, but any voter can cause the protocol to fail, in which case information about the tally may nevertheless transpire. Our second protocol introduces voting authorities which allow the implementation of the first protocol, while reducing the interaction and limiting it to be only between voters and authorities and among the authorities themselves. The simultaneous broadcast is also limited to the authorities. As long as a single authority is honest, the privacy is unconditional, however, a single corrupt authority or a single corrupt voter can cause the protocol to fail. Our final protocol provides a safeguard against corrupt voters by enabling a verification technique to allow the authorities to revoke incorrect votes. We also discuss the implementation of a simultaneous broadcast channel with the use of temporary computational assumptions, yielding versions of our protocols achieving everlasting security.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑