arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2004.02229cs.CRcs.LG

FALCON: Honest-Majority Maliciously Secure Framework for Private Deep Learning

Microsoft Research(微软研究院);Algorand Foundation(Algorand 基金会);Technion(以色列理工学院);Princeton University(普林斯顿大学);UC Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校)

Sameer Wagh, Shruti Tople, Fabrice Benhamouda, Eyal Kushilevitz, Prateek Mittal, Tal Rabin

英文摘要:

We propose Falcon, an end-to-end 3-party protocol for efficient private training and inference of large machine learning models. Falcon presents four main advantages - (i) It is highly expressive with support for high capacity networks such as VGG16 (ii) it supports batch normalization which is important for training complex networks such as AlexNet (iii) Falcon guarantees security with abort against malicious adversaries, assuming an honest majority (iv) Lastly, Falcon presents new theoretical insights for protocol design that make it highly efficient and allow it to outperform existing secure deep learning solutions. Compared to prior art for private inference, we are about 8x faster than SecureNN (PETS'19) on average and comparable to ABY3 (CCS'18). We are about 16-200x more communication efficient than either of these. For private training, we are about 6x faster than SecureNN, 4.4x faster than ABY3 and about 2-60x more communication efficient. Our experiments in the WAN setting show that over large networks and datasets, compute operations dominate the overall latency of MPC, as opposed to the communication.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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