论大卫·多伊奇的一个论点
On an Argument of David Deutsch
摘要：
我们分析了一个参数的Deutsch，其目的是表明，确定性的经典量子理论的一部分与确定性公理的经典决策理论，一起意味着一个理性的决策者的行为，如果概率的量子理论（玻恩定律）的一部分是真的。我们发现两个缺失的假设的论点，并表明，该论点也适用于一个工具主义者谁是准备接受的结果，一个量子测量是随机的频率论意义上：玻恩定律是一个后果的功能和酉不变性原则属于确定性的一部分，量子力学。不幸的是，经过必要的修正后，我们只不过是在更强的假设下给出了格里森定理的一个更简单的证明。然而，对于某些特殊情况，证明方法给出了积极的结果，而使用不同的假设，格里森。这导致了猜想，证明可以改进，以给出相同的结论，格里森在酉不变性连同一个更弱的功能不变性条件。
英文摘要：
We analyse an argument of Deutsch, which purports to show that the deterministic part of classical quantum theory together with deterministic axioms of classical decision theory, together imply that a rational decision maker behaves as if the probabilistic part of quantum theory (Born's law) is true. We uncover two missing assumptions in the argument, and show that the argument also works for an instrumentalist who is prepared to accept that the outcome of a quantum measurement is random in the frequentist sense: Born's law is a consequence of functional and unitary invariance principles belonging to the deterministic part of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, it turns out that after the necessary corrections we have done no more than give an easier proof of Gleason's theorem under stronger assumptions. However, for some special cases the proof method gives positive results while using different assumptions to Gleason. This leads to the conjecture that the proof could be improved to give the same conclusion as Gleason under unitary invariance together with a much weaker functional invariance condition.
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