适应不同的舒适度
Adapting to heterogeneous comfort levels
摘要：
我们研究的学习动力学的代理谁适应异质的舒适水平的背景下，一个El-Farol型的游戏，并表明，即使是一个无限小的程度的异质性的资源水平导致显着减少的波动的集体行动，并删除相变中观察到的模型与均匀的舒适水平。我们的分析是基于动力学方法的无序系统理论，特别是在生成功能的方法，并通过数值实验证实。我们还报告的舒适度随时间波动的系统的模拟，并指出模型的舒适度波动的代理人集体和单独分别之间的关键差异。最后，我们评论的一个可能的表征的埃尔-Farol和少数游戏根据存在或不存在的遍历性破坏相变在无限的综合响应。
英文摘要：
We study the learning dynamics of agents who adapt to heterogeneous comfort levels in the context of an El-Farol type game, and show that even an infinitesimal degree of heterogeneity in the resource levels leads to a significant reduction of the fluctuations of the collective action, and removes the phase transition observed in models with homogeneous comfort level. Our analysis is based on dynamical methods of disordered systems theory, in particular on a generating functional approach, and confirmed by numerical experiments. We also report on simulations of a system in which the comfort levels fluctuate in time, and point out crucial differences between models in which the comfort levels of the agents fluctuate collectively and individually respectively. Finally we comment on a possible characterisation of El-Farol and Minority Games according to the presence or absence of ergodicity-breaking phase transitions at infinite integrated response.
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