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arXiv math/9801096math.CO
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婚姻和分配模型的一般推广中的稳定匹配

Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander

摘要:

在双边匹配市场理论中,有两个著名的模型:婚姻模型(不涉及金钱)和分配模型(涉及支付)。Roth和Sotomayor(1990)要求解释这两种模型之间行为的相似性。我们通过引入一个通用的推广来解决这个问题,该推广保留了两个重要的特征:稳定结果的存在性和稳定结果集的格属性。

英文摘要:

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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