无限地平线非合作微分对策
Infinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Games
摘要：
对于一个非合作的微分对策，各个局中人的价值函数满足一个Hamilton-Jacobi方程组。本文考虑一类非线性费用按时间指数折扣的无限时间对策。通过对价值函数的分析，我们建立了反馈形式的纳什均衡解的存在性，并给出了其唯一性和稳定性的结果和反例。
英文摘要：
For a non-cooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite-horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
