不完全循环偏好下的社会选择
Social Choice Under Incomplete, Cyclic Preferences
摘要：
实际的个人偏好既不是完全的（=总的），也不是反对称的一般，所以至少每个准秩序必须是一个可接受的输入满意的选择规则。有人认为，传统的个人偏好“无差别”的概念是误导性的，应该用“对等”和“不确定性”取代。在这种情况下，10种类型的多数和少数的论点不同的强度进行了研究，导致社会选择规则，接受配置文件的任意自反关系。这些规则是通过许多熟悉的和一些新的条件，包括“免疫二元参数”的方式来讨论的。证明了每个满足两个弱Condorcet型条件的选择函数都是组合相容的和幂等的，并且所提出的规则都具有多项式时间复杂度.
英文摘要：
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of ``indifference'' in individual preferences is misleading and should be replaced by `equivalence' and `undecidedness'. In this context, ten types of majority and minority arguments of different strength are studied which lead to social choice rules that accept profiles of arbitrary reflexive relations. These rules are discussed by means of many familiar, and some new conditions, including `immunity from binary arguments'. Moreover, it is proved that every choice function satisfying two weak Condorcet-type conditions can be made both composition-consistent and idempotent, and that all the proposed rules have polynomial time complexity.
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