arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv cs/0610098cs.GTcs.DCcs.MA
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利用基于知识的程序描述博弈中的解概念

Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs

Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses

摘要:

我们展示了如何解决方案的概念,如纳什均衡,相关的均衡,合理化,和顺序均衡可以给出一个统一的定义,在\emph{knowledge-based programs}。直观地说,所有的解决方案的概念是两个知识为基础的程序,一个适合于游戏表示的范式,其他的游戏表示在广泛的形式。这些基于知识的程序可以被视为体现理性。即使(a)信息集没有捕获代理的知识,(b)不确定性不是由概率表示的,或者(c)潜在的游戏不是共同的知识,这种表示也有效。

英文摘要:

We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementations of two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can be viewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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