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arXiv cs/0506054cs.GT
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网络资源分配博弈中的效率损失:弹性供给情形

Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game: The Case of Elastic Supply

Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor, John N. Tsitsiklis

摘要:

我们考虑一个资源分配的问题,其中个人用户希望通过网络发送数据,以最大限度地提高他们的效用,并在每个链路上产生的成本取决于通过链路发送的总速率。众所周知,只要用户不预期他们的行为对价格的影响,简单的比例定价机制就可以使用户效用减去成本的总和(称为总盈余)最大化。继续以前的努力,量化自私行为在网络定价机制的影响,我们认为用户预期的可能性,他们的行为对链接价格的影响。在链路的边际成本函数为凸函数的假设下,我们建立了纳什均衡的存在性。我们发现,在纳什均衡的总盈余是不差的4*sqrt{2} - 5倍的最佳总盈余的一个因素,因此,效率损失时,用户是自私的不超过约34%。

英文摘要:

We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as long as users do not anticipate the effect of their actions on prices, a simple proportional pricing mechanism can maximize the sum of users' utilities minus the cost (called aggregate surplus). Continuing previous efforts to quantify the effects of selfish behavior in network pricing mechanisms, we consider the possibility that users anticipate the effect of their actions on link prices. Under the assumption that the links' marginal cost functions are convex, we establish existence of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium is no worse than a factor of 4*sqrt{2} - 5 times the optimal aggregate surplus; thus, the efficiency loss when users are selfish is no more than approximately 34%.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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