arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv cs/0312025cs.CRcs.AI
收藏

安全协议分析的软约束编程

Soft Constraint Programming to Analysing Security Protocols

Giampaolo Bella, Stefano Bistarelli

摘要:

安全协议规定了计算机网络的远程主体应如何交互以获得特定的安全目标。保密和认证的关键目标可以通过各种形式实现,每种形式的强度不同。使用软(而不是脆)的约束,我们开发了一个统一的正式概念的两个目标。它们不再像现有文献中那样被形式化为仅仅是/否属性,而是获得了一个额外的参数,即安全级别。例如,不同的消息可以享有不同级别的机密性,或者主体可以通过不同的主体实现不同级别的身份验证。协议分析的一般框架内的目标是正式的,是服从机械化的模型检验。在应用该框架分析非对称Needham-Schroeder协议之后,我们最近发现了对该协议的一种新的攻击,作为以前被攻击的主体的报复形式。在对该攻击进行了评论之后,我们将在一个更大的、大规模部署的协议上展示框架,该协议由三个阶段组成。

英文摘要:

Security protocols stipulate how the remote principals of a computer network should interact in order to obtain specific security goals. The crucial goals of confidentiality and authentication may be achieved in various forms, each of different strength. Using soft (rather than crisp) constraints, we develop a uniform formal notion for the two goals. They are no longer formalised as mere yes/no properties as in the existing literature, but gain an extra parameter, the security level. For example, different messages can enjoy different levels of confidentiality, or a principal can achieve different levels of authentication with different principals. The goals are formalised within a general framework for protocol analysis that is amenable to mechanisation by model checking. Following the application of the framework to analysing the asymmetric Needham-Schroeder protocol, we have recently discovered a new attack on that protocol as a form of retaliation by principals who have been attacked previously. Having commented on that attack, we then demonstrate the framework on a bigger, largely deployed protocol consisting of three phases, Kerberos.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑