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arXiv cs/0103020cs.AIcs.LO
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信念修正:一种批判

Belief Revision: A Critique

Nir Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern

摘要:

我们仔细研究的基本原理的信念改变的方法在文献中,并强调我们认为的方法问题。我们认为,要仔细研究信念变化,我们必须非常明确的“本体论”或信念变化过程中的场景。这是在以前的工作中所缺少的,它的重点是假设。我们的分析表明,我们必须特别注意两个问题,往往被认为是理所当然的:第一个是我们如何建模代理的认知状态。(Do我们使用一组信念,或者一个更丰富的结构,比如世界的排序?如果我们使用一组信念,这些信念用什么语言表达?)我们表明,即使假设已被称为“无可争议”是不合理的,当代理人的信念包括她自己的认识状态以及外部世界的信念。二是意见的现状。(Are观察是真实的,还是只是相信的?在后一种情况下,信念有多坚定?)当我们考虑迭代的信念修正时,关于观测状态的问题尤其会出现,我们必须面对由p修正然后由非p修正的可能性。

英文摘要:

We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ``ontology'' or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken for granted: The first is how we model the agent's epistemic state. (Do we use a set of beliefs, or a richer structure, such as an ordering on worlds? And if we use a set of beliefs, in what language are these beliefs are expressed?) We show that even postulates that have been called ``beyond controversy'' are unreasonable when the agent's beliefs include beliefs about her own epistemic state as well as the external world. The second is the status of observations. (Are observations known to be true, or just believed? In the latter case, how firm is the belief?) Issues regarding the status of observations arise particularly when we consider iterated belief revision, and we must confront the possibility of revising by p and then by not-p.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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