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arXiv cs/0204032cs.AI
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信念修正与理性推理

Belief Revision and Rational Inference

Michael Freund, Daniel Lehmann

摘要:

信念修正的(扩展的)AGM假设似乎是用一个任意公式来处理给定理论K的修正,而不是用同一个公式来约束两个不同理论的修正。提出了一个新的假设,并与文献中提出的其他类似假设进行了比较。满足这一新假设的AGM修正与理性的、保持一致性的关系一一对应。这种对应关系被明确描述。两种观点迭代修订区分和讨论。

英文摘要:

The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and compared with other similar postulates that have been proposed in the literature. The AGM revisions that satisfy this new postulate stand in one-to-one correspondence with the rational, consistency-preserving relations. This correspondence is described explicitly. Two viewpoints on iterative revisions are distinguished and discussed.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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