个性化激励政策中的操纵局限性
The Limits of Manipulation within Personalized Incentive Policies
AI总结:
本文针对个性化激励政策中智能体的操纵问题,构建斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型,考虑监管机构的特征学习过程,发现分类不确定性可威慑操纵,该框架可用于测试政策稳健性。
摘要:
需求管理政策旨在引导个体行为转向可持续选择(如商品、交通方式)。个性化激励政策会根据智能体的需求和约束定制补贴,但个性化也使监管机构面临智能体的策略性操纵行为。智能体可通过操纵获利的程度仍未被充分理解,这限制了此类政策的适用性。本文通过分析确定了操纵对智能体有利的条件。我们将智能体可能模拟不同特征以从监管机构获取更高补贴的情况形式化为斯塔克尔伯格博弈。以往研究通常假设监管机构会立即将智能体归类为模拟的用户特征,相比之下,我们明确建模监管机构基于观察到的过往行为学习智能体特征的过程,这使得操纵更难,因为它迫使智能体始终按照模拟的特征行事,从而放弃遵循自身真实偏好,因此操纵性智能体产生了通常被忽略的操纵成本。通过考虑该成本,我们得到一个反直觉的发现:尽管分类不确定性会降低个性化准确性,但它可通过威慑操纵使监管机构受益。我们确定了智能体操纵获利的上限,当监管机构更难区分特征时,该上限会更严格。在伦敦乘客出行方式选择数据集上的模拟结果说明了这种威慑效应。因此,该框架可用于在部署前对个性化激励政策的稳健性进行压力测试。
英文摘要:
Demand management policies aim to shift individual behavior toward sustainable choices (e.g., goods, transport modes). Personalized incentive policies tailor subsidies to agents' needs and constraints, but personalization also exposes the regulator to agents' strategic manipulative behavior. The extent to which agents can profitably manipulate such policies remains poorly understood, which limits their applicability. This paper establishes analytically the conditions under which manipulation benefits the agent. We formalize a Stackelberg game in which an agent may simulate a different profile to extract higher incentives from a regulator. Previous work typically assumes that the regulator would instantaneously classify agents into the simulated user profile. In contrast, we explicitly model the regulator's process of learning the agent profile, based on observed past behavior. This makes manipulation harder, since it forces the agent to consistently behave according to a simulated profile, thus renouncing following their true preferences. Manipulative agents thus incur a Cost of Manipulation, which has typically been neglected. By accounting for it, we get a counterintuitive finding: although classification uncertainty reduces personalization accuracy, it may benefit the regulator by deterring manipulation. We establish an upper bound on the agent's gain from manipulation, which becomes stricter as profiles become harder to distinguish for the regulator. Simulations on the London Passenger Mode Choice dataset illustrate this deterrence effect. The framework can therefore be used to stress-test the robustness of personalized incentive policies before deployment.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。