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arXiv 2610.13086cs.CR

安全图:当安全响应成为网络物理系统中的攻击面

Safety Graph: When Safety Responses Become Attack Surfaces in Cyber-Physical Systems

Colorado State University(科罗拉多州立大学)

Rakesh Podder, Philip D. Hopkins, Sarath Sreedharan, Indrakshi Ray, Indrajit Ray

AI总结:

本研究提出安全图(SG)框架,统一攻击图等三种范式,将其编译为AI规划问题,通过田纳西-伊斯曼工厂仿真,发现安全响应诱导的横向移动,为IT-OT攻击建模提供新方法。

摘要:

现代工业控制系统(ICS)易遭受网络攻击,触发运营技术(OT)层的安全故障。传统缓解OT层任何故障的方式是实施安全响应,但本研究表明,这些响应会开辟新的攻击面,从而大幅扩大横向移动的范围。现有框架对网络到物理的升级进行建模,但未提供机制来推理这些针对OT故障的安全响应如何在信息技术(IT)层触发新的级联网络攻击。为实现此类推理,我们引入安全图(Safety Graph, SG),这是一个在共享命题状态空间上统一攻击图(Attack Graph, AG)、故障树(Fault Tree, FT)和事件树(Event Tree, ET)三种范式的形式化框架,捕获完整的双向IT-OT级联。我们提供SG到经典AI规划问题的健全且完备的编译,使用A*算法执行规划搜索以查找跨层级联路径。通过对田纳西-伊斯曼化学过程工厂进行Web3D建模与仿真(该工厂是广泛使用的化学工程基准,作为测试控制、监控和故障传播的标准),我们证明SG的规划编译可自动发现安全响应诱导的横向移动,并识别现有模型无法识别的负责屏障。复杂度与可扩展性分析表征了SG的规划编译如何随模型规模和级联深度扩展。据我们所知,SG是首个对IT-OT攻击进行形式化建模并使操作员能够探索网络攻击触发ICS中级联故障问题的框架。

英文摘要:

Modern industrial control systems (ICS) are susceptible to cyber attacks triggering safety failures in the operational technology (OT) layer. The traditional way to mitigate any failure in OT is to implement safety responses. However, we show in this work that these responses can open up new attack surfaces, thereby vastly expanding the scope of lateral movement. Existing frameworks model cyber-to-physical escalation but provide no mechanism to reason about how these safety responses to OT-failures can trigger new cascading cyber attacks in the Information Technology (IT) layer. To enable such reasoning, we introduce Safety Graph (SG), a formal framework unifying three paradigms - Attack Graphs (AG), Fault Trees (FT), and Event Trees (ET) - over a shared propositional state space, capturing the full bidirectional IT-OT cascade. We provide a sound and complete compilation of SG to a classical AI planning problem, performing plan search using A* to find cross-layer cascade paths. Through a Web3D modeling and simulation of the Tennessee Eastman chemical process plant, which is a widely used chemical engineering benchmark serving as a standard for testing control, monitoring and fault propagation, we demonstrate that the planning compilation of SG automatically discovers safety-response-induced lateral movements, and identifies the responsible barriers that are unidentifiable under existing models. A complexity and scalability analysis characterizes how the planning compilation of SG scales with model size and cascade depth. To the best of our knowledge, SG is the first framework to formally model IT-OT attacks and enable operators to explore the problem of cyber attacks triggering cascading failures in ICS.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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