arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2512.02414cs.CR
收藏

基于缺失数据的航天基础设施网络攻击特征化:框架与案例研究

Characterizing Cyber Attacks against Space Infrastructures with Missing Data: Framework and Case Study

Ekzhin Ear, Jose Luis Castanon Remy, Caleb Chang, Qiren Que, Antonia Feffer, Shouhuai Xu

AI总结:

本文提出框架和方法,用于表征针对航天基础设施的网络攻击,通过外推缺失数据重建攻击链,揭示攻击复杂性及防护效果。

摘要:

航天基础设施的网络安全是一个新兴领域,尽管早在1977年就发生了与航天相关的网络安全事件(例如卫星传输信号被劫持)。目前尚无单一数据集能够记录过去发生的针对航天基础设施的网络攻击;这些事件往往分散在媒体报道中,且缺失许多细节,我们称之为缺失数据问题。然而,即使包含此类报告的“低质量”数据集也极具价值,因为航天网络安全数据匮乏,且航天基础设施往往因政府限制而无法披露。这促使我们提出一个研究问题:如何表征现实中的针对航天基础设施的网络攻击?在本文中,我们通过提出包含指标的框架来解决这一问题,同时利用诸如空间攻击研究与战术分析(SPARTA)和对抗性战术、技术和常识(ATT&CK)等方法,以有原则的方式“外推”缺失数据。我们展示了如何利用外推数据来重建“假设但合理的”空间网络攻击链和实际发生的网络攻击行动。为了展示该框架的实用性,我们提取了108次针对航天基础设施的网络攻击数据,并展示了如何将包含缺失信息的“低质量”数据集外推,推导出6206条攻击技术级别的空间网络攻击链。我们的发现包括:针对航天基础设施的网络攻击正变得越来越复杂;成功保护空间与用户段之间的链接段可能阻止了近一半的108次攻击。我们将公开我们的数据集。

英文摘要:

Cybersecurity of space infrastructures is an emerging topic, despite space-related cybersecurity incidents occurring as early as 1977 (i.e., hijacking of a satellite transmission signal). There is no single dataset that documents cyber attacks against space infrastructures that have occurred in the past; instead, these incidents are often scattered in media reports while missing many details, which we dub the missing-data problem. Nevertheless, even ``low-quality'' datasets containing such reports would be extremely valuable because of the dearth of space cybersecurity data and the sensitivity of space infrastructures which are often restricted from disclosure by governments. This prompts a research question: How can we characterize real-world cyber attacks against space infrastructures? In this paper, we address the problem by proposing a framework, including metrics, while also addressing the missing-data problem by leveraging methodologies such as the Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) and the Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) to ``extrapolate'' the missing data in a principled fashion. We show how the extrapolated data can be used to reconstruct ``hypothetical but plausible'' space cyber kill chains and space cyber attack campaigns that have occurred in practice. To show the usefulness of the framework, we extract data for 108 cyber attacks against space infrastructures and show how to extrapolate this ``low-quality'' dataset containing missing information to derive 6,206 attack technique-level space cyber kill chains. Our findings include: cyber attacks against space infrastructures are getting increasingly sophisticated; successful protection of the link segment between the space and user segments could have thwarted nearly half of the 108 attacks. We will make our dataset available.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑