AI 中文总结
本文针对关键基础设施网络安全提出反脆弱性理论，结合两类数据集验证假设，发现OT相关行业扰动事件占比更高，攻击会增大过程偏差，为反脆弱性测试确立了两个前提条件。
AI 中文摘要
关键基础设施网络安全日益需要能从恢复转向在扰动下实现有限改进的框架，但针对运营技术的实证基础理论仍十分有限。本文开发了适用于关键基础设施（CI）网络安全的反脆弱性理论（AFT），该理论以五状态弹性系统模型为基础，采用基于Jensen增益和扰动后增益的有限数学定义。双层实证设计将CISSM网络事件数据库中与CI相关的子集，与HAI硬件在环工业控制数据集配对，检验三个验证性假设和一个探索性命题。与对比行业相比，邻近运营技术（OT）的行业受扰动或混合事件的比例显著更高（65.3%对46.8%，p<0.001），且物理攻击和数据攻击子类型更为集中。在HAI数据中，带攻击标签的观测值超出基线偏差第95百分位的概率是正常观测值的7.43倍（p<0.001）。在连续攻击窗口中，平均过程状态偏差显著下降（Spearman秩相关系数ρ=-0.688，p=0.007），表明存在可测量的响应变化，而非自适应增益的证明。综上，研究结果为未来反脆弱性测试确立了两个前提：差异化的脆弱性负担和过程级扰动的可观测性。
英文摘要
Critical infrastructure cybersecurity increasingly requires frameworks that move beyond recovery toward bounded improvement under disruption, yet empirically grounded theories for operational technology remain limited. This paper develops a Theory of Antifragility (AFT) for critical infrastructure (CI) cybersecurity, anchored in a five-state Resilient System Model and a bounded mathematical definition based on Jensen gain and post-disruption gain. A two-layer empirical design pairs a CI-relevant subset of the CISSM Cyber Events Database with the HAI hardware-in-the-loop industrial control dataset and tests three confirmatory hypotheses and one exploratory proposition. OT-adjacent sectors show significantly higher shares of disruptive or mixed events than comparison sectors (65.3 percent versus 46.8 percent, p less than 0.001), together with a greater concentration of physical-attack and data-attack subtypes. In HAI, attack-labeled observations were 7.43 times more likely than normal observations to exceed the 95th percentile of baseline deviation (p less than 0.001). Across successive attack windows, mean process-state deviation declined significantly (Spearman rho = -0.688, p = 0.007), indicating measurable response variation rather than proof of adaptive gain. Together, the findings establish two prerequisites for future antifragility testing: differentiated fragility burden and process-level perturbation observability.
Comments5 tables, 1 figure
Journal refFlowerday. S., Papa, M., Flowerday, E., Beyond Resilience: Antifragility in Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Electronics 2026, 15, 2566
DOI：10.3390/electronics15122566
