改变游戏规则：惯性、制度设计与均衡转变
Changing the Game: Status-Quo Inertia, Institutional Design, and Equilibrium Transition
AI总结：
本文研究了在均衡选择存在惯性的情况下，制度干预的效果，指出改变可行行动空间的干预比传统方法更有效，强调制度惯性下的政策重点应是改变游戏本身而非微调现有规则。
摘要：
许多经济干预被设计为对激励的边际改变。然而在协调、制度持续性和路径依赖的环境中，此类改革往往对行为影响有限。本文研究了在均衡选择显示惯性的情况下，干预游戏的效果。当干预前的均衡仍为纳什均衡时，干预可能无法改变行为。相比之下，修改可行行动空间的干预，尤其是删除和替换干预，能更有效，因为它们消除了持续性的战略基础。本文发展了一个简单框架，推导了通用结果，提供了完整证明，并通过气候转型、平台监管、金融改革和工业现代化的例子来说明经济影响。分析强调了一个基本政策教训：当低效均衡制度化时，问题往往不在于如何更精细地定价现有游戏，而在于如何改变游戏本身。
英文摘要：
Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies interventions in games when equilibrium selection displays status-quo inertia: if the pre-intervention equilibrium remains a Nash equilibrium after policy, it continues to be selected. In that environment, price-based interventions and simple option expansion may fail even when they improve welfare in a partial-equilibrium sense. By contrast, interventions that modify the feasible action space, especially deletion and replacement interventions, can be substantially more effective because they remove the strategic basis for persistence. We develop a simple framework, derive general results, provide complete proofs, and illustrate the economics with examples from climate transition, platform regulation, financial reform, and industrial modernization. The analysis highlights a basic policy lesson: when inefficient equilibria are institutionally entrenched, the central problem is often not how to price the existing game more finely, but how to change the game itself.
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