Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) 是一个迅速增长的部署挑战,因为具有加密相关量子计算机(CRQC)的持续发展,使传统用于X.509的加密算法面临攻击风险。然而,PQC在现实网络中引入了显著的部署挑战,握手大小从5倍增加到超过20倍,相比经典算法。本文评估了CDN聚焦的TLS条件下首次字节时间(TTFB),以表征将现有互联网基础设施过渡到量子安全证书方案的延迟成本。我们观察到,当证书链大小超过传输层数据飞行限制时,TTFB出现离散增加。为了隔离证书链的影响,我们评估了基于ECDSA和ML-DSA的证书方案,通过受控添加证书扩展生成相似大小的证书链。我们还检查了CDN属性如会话恢复、证书大小优化和地理分布如何减少延迟惩罚。我们利用通过高性能计算系统(NCSA)监控的TLS流量,利用千兆字节网络连接跨全国,以量化现实中的会话恢复率。我们比较CDN驱动的大小优化与Merkle Tree Certificates(MTC)以检查大小减少如何允许证书链保持在飞行限制阈值以下。我们发现,MTC允许支持的证书链大小增加2-3倍,而CDN基于的优化仅能提供有限的减少,支持约1.6倍的证书链大小增加。
英文摘要:
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly growing deployment challenge as cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) continue to advance, leaving traditional cryptographic algorithms used in X.509 vulnerable to attack. However, PQC introduces significant deployment challenges in real-world networks, with handshake sizes increasing from 5x to over 20x compared to classical algorithms. In this work, we evaluate the time to first byte (TTFB) under CDN-focused TLS conditions to characterize the latency cost of transitioning existing internet infrastructure to quantum-safe certificate schemes. We observe discrete increases in TTFB as certificate chain sizes exceed transport layer data flight limits. To isolate the impact of certificate chains, we evaluate both ECDSA and ML-DSA-based certificate schemes, generating similarly sized certificate chains through controlled addition of certificate extensions. We additionally examine how CDN properties such as session resumption, certificate size optimizations, and geographical distribution reduce latency penalties. We utilize Zeek-monitored TLS traffic through a High-Performance Computing System (NCSA) with terabyte network connectivity across the nation to quantify real-world session resumption rates. We compare CDN-driven size optimization with Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) to examine how size reductions allow certificate chains to remain under the flight limit threshold. We find that MTC allows for 2x-3x increase in supportable certificate chain size, whereas CDN-based optimizations yield more limited reductions, supporting up to approximately 1.6x certificate chain size increase.
HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks
Ho Chi Minh City Open University(胡志明市开放大学);Faculty of Information Technology, Ho Chi Minh City University of Industry and Trade (HUIT)(胡志明市工业贸易大学信息技术学院);Faculty of Information Technology, Ho Chi Minh City Open University(胡志明市开放大学信息技术学院);Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT)(胡志明市理工大学计算机科学与工程系);Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City(越南国家大学胡志明市分校)