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arXiv 2604.00615econ.TH
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为少数群体筛选工作人员

Screening Workers with Affirmative Action

National Central University(中央大学)

Charles Po-Cheng Huang

AI总结:

本文研究了在二维筛选模型中,通过合同设计实现最优激励的问题,其中一组身份可被代理人验证但不可被证伪。研究发现,当受保护群体成本类型较高时,最优合同能实现双重分离;而当受保护群体成本较低时,合同则在不歧视情况下实现群体合并但成本分离。

摘要:

本文研究了一个二维筛选模型中的最优合同设计问题,其中一组身份可通过代理人验证但无法被证伪。雇主向具有不同成本类型和群体成员身份的代理人提供合同。受美国联邦政策(工作机会税收抵免)启发,雇主通过雇佣受保护群体成员获得税收优惠。假设受保护代理人通常具有较高的成本类型,最优合同会促使代理人通过合同选择完全分离两个维度:代理人通过合同选择揭示成本类型和群体身份。此外,雇主愿意以比非特征代理人更高的成本阈值雇佣特征代理人,且该阈值随税收抵免增加而增加。相反,当受保护代理人通常具有较低的成本类型时,没有税收抵免的最优设计会合并群体但通过成本类型分离。这些结果表明,根据群体间成本分布的顺序,积极行动和非歧视都可以成为最优策略。

英文摘要:

This paper examines the optimal contracts in a two-dimensional screening model where one dimension (group identity) is verifiable by agents but not falsifiable. A principal offers contracts to agents who differ in cost types and group membership. Motivated by the United States Federal policy, Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), the principal receives tax benefits for hiring agents from protected groups. Under the assumption that the protected agents tend to have higher cost types, the optimal contract induces full separation across both dimensions: agents reveal the cost type and the group identity through contract choice. Furthermore, the principal is willing to hire the trait agents up to a higher cost threshold than the non-trait agents, and this threshold increases with the tax credit. Conversely, when the protected agents tend to have lower cost types, the optimal design without tax credits pools groups while separating by cost type. These results demonstrate that both affirmative action and non-discrimination can be optimal depending on the cost distribution ordering across groups.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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