筛选和信息共享外部性
Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities
摘要:
在许多情况下,多个不知情的代理人同时与一个单一的知情代理人在多个时期的每一个讨价还价。例如,工人和公司每年都要就工资问题进行谈判,而公司拥有关于工人产出价值的私人信息。我研究在这些设置的透明度的影响,不知情的代理人可能会观察别人的过去的讨价还价的结果,例如工资。我表明,在均衡,每个不知情的代理人将选择在每个时期是否尝试分开的知情代理人的类型(屏幕)或接收相同的结果,无论类型(池)。换句话说,代理人通过他们的讨价还价策略进行某种形式的实验。有两个主要的理论见解。首先,存在一种互补的筛选效应:在均衡中筛选的代理人越多,每个代理人必须支付的信息租金就越低。第二,知情代理人的收益将具有一定的超模块性属性,这意味着筛选的均衡是“脆弱的”不知情的代理人的偏差。我将研究结果应用于研究薪酬保密法规和反歧视政策。我发现,令人惊讶的是,薪酬歧视的处罚对谈判结果没有影响。我讨论了这一结果如何取决于歧视案件的法律框架,并建议修改,以提高反歧视法规的效力。特别是,反歧视法应排除所谓的“工资谈判辩护”。
英文摘要:
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the value of workers' output. I study the effects of transparency in these settings; uninformed agents may observe others' past bargaining outcomes, e.g. wages. I show that in equilibrium, each uninformed agent will choose in each period whether to try to separate the informed agent's types (screen) or receive the same outcome regardless of type (pool). In other words, the agents engage in a form of experimentation via their bargaining strategies. There are two main theoretical insights. First, there is a complementary screening effect: the more agents screen in equilibrium, the lower the information rents that each will have to pay. Second, the payoff of the informed agent will have a certain supermodularity property, which implies that equilibria with screening are "fragile" to deviations by uninformed agents. I apply the results to study pay-secrecy regulations and anti-discrimination policy. I show that, surprisingly, penalties for pay discrimination have no impact on bargaining outcomes. I discuss how this result depends on the legal framework for discrimination cases, and suggest changes to enhance the efficacy of anti-discrimination regulations. In particular, anti-discrimination law should preclude the so-called "salary negotiation defense".
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