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arXiv 2603.14124cs.CReess.IV
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自动驾驶平台安全攻击的实验评估

Experimental Evaluation of Security Attacks on Self-Driving Car Platforms

Cal Poly Pomona(加州州立理工大学波莫纳分校)

Viet K. Nguyen, Nathan Lee, Mohammad Husain

AI总结:

本文通过实验评估了五种攻击类型对低成本自动驾驶平台的影响,揭示了不同攻击产生的特征指纹,为攻击监测和防御机制提供基础。

摘要:

自动驾驶地面车辆的深度学习感知管道易受对抗操纵和网络层干扰。本文系统地对五种攻击类型(FGSM、PGD、中间人攻击、拒绝服务攻击和幻影攻击)进行了硬件实验评估,使用标准化实验协议和自动化日志记录,系统地表征了攻击行为的三个维度:控制偏差、计算成本和运行时响应性。分析表明,不同攻击类型在这些维度上产生一致且可分离的

英文摘要:

Deep learning-based perception pipelines in autonomous ground vehicles are vulnerable to both adversarial manipulation and network-layer disruption. We present a systematic, on-hardware experimental evaluation of five attack classes: FGSM, PGD, man-in-the-middle (MitM), denial-of-service (DoS), and phantom attacks on low-cost autonomous vehicle platforms (JetRacer and Yahboom). Using a standardized 13-second experimental protocol and comprehensive automated logging, we systematically characterize three dimensions of attack behavior:(i) control deviation, (ii) computational cost, and (iii) runtime responsiveness. Our analysis reveals that distinct attack classes produce consistent and separable "fingerprints" across these dimensions: perception attacks (MitM output manipulation and phantom projection) generate high steering deviation signatures with nominal computational overhead, PGD produces combined steering perturbation and computational load signatures across multiple dimensions, and DoS exhibits frame rate and latency degradation signatures with minimal control-plane perturbation. We demonstrate that our fingerprinting framework generalizes across both digital attacks (adversarial perturbations, network manipulation) and environmental attacks (projected false features), providing a foundation for attack-aware monitoring systems and targeted, signature-based defense mechanisms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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