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arXiv 2106.09249cs.CRcs.CVcs.LG
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Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Perception in Autonomous Driving Under Physical-World Attacks

University of Michigan(密歇根大学);NVIDIA Research(英伟达研究院);Arizona State University(亚利桑那州立大学);Inceptio(嬴彻科技);Baidu Research(百度研究院);National Engineering Laboratory of Deep Learning Technology and Application(深度学习技术及应用国家工程实验室);University of California, Irvine(加州大学欧文分校);University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)

Yulong Cao*, Ningfei Wang*, Chaowei Xiao*, Dawei Yang*, Jin Fang, Ruigang Yang, Qi Alfred Chen, Mingyan Liu, Bo Li

英文摘要:

In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is both security and safety critical. Despite various prior studies on its security issues, all of them only consider attacks on camera- or LiDAR-based AD perception alone. However, production AD systems today predominantly adopt a Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) based design, which in principle can be more robust against these attacks under the assumption that not all fusion sources are (or can be) attacked at the same time. In this paper, we present the first study of security issues of MSF-based perception in AD systems. We directly challenge the basic MSF design assumption above by exploring the possibility of attacking all fusion sources simultaneously. This allows us for the first time to understand how much security guarantee MSF can fundamentally provide as a general defense strategy for AD perception. We formulate the attack as an optimization problem to generate a physically-realizable, adversarial 3D-printed object that misleads an AD system to fail in detecting it and thus crash into it. We propose a novel attack pipeline that addresses two main design challenges: (1) non-differentiable target camera and LiDAR sensing systems, and (2) non-differentiable cell-level aggregated features popularly used in LiDAR-based AD perception. We evaluate our attack on MSF included in representative open-source industry-grade AD systems in real-world driving scenarios. Our results show that the attack achieves over 90% success rate across different object types and MSF. Our attack is also found stealthy, robust to victim positions, transferable across MSF algorithms, and physical-world realizable after being 3D-printed and captured by LiDAR and camera devices. To concretely assess the end-to-end safety impact, we further perform simulation evaluation and show that it can cause a 100% vehicle collision rate for an industry-grade AD system.

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