基于跟踪共识的分布式多目标跟踪中的标签劫持
Label Hijacking in Track Consensus-Based Distributed Multi-Target Tracking
AI总结:
本文揭示了基于跟踪共识的分布式多目标跟踪中存在身份层面的脆弱性,并提出标签劫持攻击,通过伪造跟踪破坏目标身份一致性,强调了在DMTT框架中提升共识层鲁棒性的重要性。
摘要:
分布式多目标跟踪(DMTT)在有限视野(FoV)传感器网络中通常会遇到标签不一致的问题,即不同节点对同一目标的身份存在分歧。最近的基于跟踪共识的DMTT(TC-DMTT)策略通过基于度量的跟踪匹配来强制运动学和标签一致。然而,它们在对抗性条件下的行为仍鲜有研究。在本文中,我们揭示了TC-DMTT中的身份层面的脆弱性,并引入了标签劫持的概念:一种攻击,其中攻击者注入伪造的跟踪以在网络中破坏目标身份。借鉴经典拉偏欺骗在雷达中的类比,我们正式化了攻击隐蔽性的概念,并推导出一种基于优化的策略来构建此类攻击。一个三传感器网络案例研究展示了所提出攻击对标签一致性和跟踪准确性的影响,显示了成功的目标伪装。总体而言,本文的工作突显了在DMTT框架中重新思考共识层鲁棒性的必要性。
英文摘要:
Distributed multi-target tracking (DMTT) in limited field-of-view (FoV) sensor networks commonly suffers from label inconsistency, whereby different nodes disagree on the identity of the same target. Recent track-consensus DMTT (TC-DMTT) strategies mitigate this issue by enforcing kinematic and label agreement through metric-based track matching. Nevertheless, their behavior under adversarial conditions remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we reveal identity-level vulnerabilities in TC-DMTT and introduce the concept of label hijacking: an attack in which an adversary injects spoofed tracks to corrupt target identities across the network. Drawing on an analogy to classical pull-off deception in radar, we formalize a notion of attack stealthiness and derive an optimization-based strategy for crafting such attacks. A three-sensor network case study demonstrates the impact of the proposed attack on label consistency and tracking accuracy, showing successful target impersonation. Overall, this work highlights the need to rethink robustness at the consensus layer in DMTT frameworks.
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