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AndroWasm:通过WebAssembly对Android恶意软件混淆的实证研究

AndroWasm: an Empirical Study on Android Malware Obfuscation through WebAssembly

University Of Cagliari(卡利亚里大学);Consorzio Interuniversitario Nazionale per l’Informatica (CINI)(意大利国家信息学大学联盟)

Diego Soi, Silvia Lucia Sanna, Lorenzo Pisu, Leonardo Regano, Giorgio Giacinto

AI总结:

本文通过实证研究探讨了Android恶意软件利用WebAssembly技术进行混淆和规避检测的方法及效果。

摘要:

近年来,隐蔽的Android恶意软件越来越多地采用复杂技术来绕过自动检测机制并增强手动分析的难度。攻击者通常依赖混淆、反打包、隐写术、污染和规避技术来对抗基于AI的工具以及内存中的执行,以隐藏恶意功能。在本文中,我们研究了WebAssembly(Wasm)作为一种新型技术,用于隐藏恶意负载并规避传统的静态分析和签名匹配机制。虽然Wasm通常用于渲染特定的网络游戏并与其他网络原生组件交互,但我们深入分析了Android可能采用的机制,以将Wasm模块纳入其执行流程中。此外,我们提供了概念验证,以展示一种威胁模型,其中攻击者嵌入并执行恶意过程,有效绕过工业最先进的工具,如VirusTotal和MobSF的IOC检测。

英文摘要:

In recent years, stealthy Android malware has increasingly adopted sophisticated techniques to bypass automatic detection mechanisms and harden manual analysis. Adversaries typically rely on obfuscation, anti-repacking, steganography, poisoning, and evasion techniques to AI-based tools, and in-memory execution to conceal malicious functionality. In this paper, we investigate WebAssembly (Wasm) as a novel technique for hiding malicious payloads and evading traditional static analysis and signature-matching mechanisms. While Wasm is typically employed to render specific gaming activities and interact with the native components in web browsers, we provide an in-depth analysis on the mechanisms Android may employ to include Wasm modules in its execution pipeline. Additionally, we provide Proofs-of-Concept to demonstrate a threat model in which an attacker embeds and executes malicious routines, effectively bypassing IoC detection by industrial state-of-the-art tools, like VirusTotal and MobSF.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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