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arXiv 1801.08115cs.CR
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Android恶意软件生态系统中的八年骑手测量:演变和经验教训

Eight Years of Rider Measurement in the Android Malware Ecosystem: Evolution and Lessons Learned

Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Gianluca Stringhini

摘要:

尽管Android恶意软件构成的威胁越来越大,但研究社区仍然缺乏对平台上活跃的恶意软件家族暴露的常见行为和趋势的全面了解。如果没有这样的观点,研究人员就有可能开发出只检测过时威胁的系统,而忽略了最新的威胁。在本文中,我们对Android恶意软件行为进行了迄今为止最大规模的测量,分析了八年内(从2010年到2017年)属于1.2K系列的120多万个恶意软件样本。我们的目标是了解Android恶意软件的行为如何随着时间的推移而演变,重点是重新包装恶意软件。在这种类型的威胁中,不同的无害应用程序都带有恶意负载(骑手),允许廉价的恶意软件制造。研究重新打包的恶意软件时面临的主要挑战之一是将应用程序切片,将良性组件与恶意组件分开。为了解决这个问题,我们使用差异分析来隔离与活动无关的软件组件,并单独研究恶意骑手的行为。我们的分析框架依赖于集体知识库和从多个反病毒供应商提取的情报系统化的最新进展。我们发现,自2010年起步以来,Android恶意软件生态系统已经发生了显着变化,无论是恶意样本执行的恶意活动类型,还是恶意软件为避免检测而使用的混淆级别。然后,我们表明,我们的框架可以帮助分析师谁试图研究未知的恶意软件家族。最后,我们讨论了我们的研究结果对Android恶意软件检测研究的意义,强调了研究社区需要进一步关注的领域。

英文摘要:

Despite the growing threat posed by Android malware, the research community is still lacking a comprehensive view of common behaviors and trends exposed by malware families active on the platform. Without such view, the researchers incur the risk of developing systems that only detect outdated threats, missing the most recent ones. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of Android malware behavior to date, analyzing over 1.2 million malware samples that belong to 1.2K families over a period of eight years (from 2010 to 2017). We aim at understanding how the behavior of Android malware has evolved over time, focusing on repackaging malware. In this type of threats different innocuous apps are piggybacked with a malicious payload (rider), allowing inexpensive malware manufacturing. One of the main challenges posed when studying repackaged malware is slicing the app to split benign components apart from the malicious ones. To address this problem, we use differential analysis to isolate software components that are irrelevant to the campaign and study the behavior of malicious riders alone. Our analysis framework relies on collective repositories and recent advances on the systematization of intelligence extracted from multiple anti-virus vendors. We find that since its infancy in 2010, the Android malware ecosystem has changed significantly, both in the type of malicious activity performed by the malicious samples and in the level of obfuscation used by malware to avoid detection. We then show that our framework can aid analysts who attempt to study unknown malware families. Finally, we discuss what our findings mean for Android malware detection research, highlighting areas that need further attention by the research community.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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