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arXiv 2602.06348cs.LGcs.GT

博弈中的对抗学习:带轮盘反馈的对数纯策略最大化遗憾

Adversarial Learning in Games with Bandit Feedback: Logarithmic Pure-Strategy Maximin Regret

The University of Tokyo and RIKEN(东京大学和RIKEN);University of Southern California(美国南加州大学);University of Washington(华盛顿大学)

Shinji Ito, Haipeng Luo, Arnab Maiti, Taira Tsuchiya, Yue Wu

AI总结:

研究在轮盘反馈下通过Tsallis-INF和Maximin-UCB算法实现零和博弈的纯策略最大化遗憾最小化,提出两种算法并推广至双线性博弈。

摘要:

学习零和博弈是博弈论和机器学习中的基本问题。尽管在自我对战设置或全信息反馈下已取得显著进展,但现实应用常常迫使学习者面对未知的任意对手,并限制学习者只能在轮盘反馈中进行,此时只能观察到实际采取动作的收益。在这样的挑战性设置中,已知外部遗憾不可避免(其中T是轮数)。为了克服这一障碍,我们研究了在轮盘反馈下零和博弈中的对抗学习,旨在最小化对纯策略最大化遗憾的差距——我们称之为纯策略最大化遗憾。我们分析了两种轮盘反馈模型:无信息(仅揭示实际收益)和有信息(揭示收益和对手的动作)。对于无信息的正常形式博弈轮盘学习,我们证明Tsallis-INF算法可以达到O(c log T)的实例依赖遗憾,其中c是游戏相关的参数。关键的是,我们证明了一个信息论下界,显示对c的依赖是必要的。为了克服这种难度,我们转向有信息的设置,并引入Maximin-UCB,它获得另一个形式为O(c' log T)的遗憾界,其中c'是另一个游戏相关的参数,可能比c小得多。最后,我们将这些结果推广到双线性博弈,针对无信息和有信息设置分别提出Tsallis-FTRL-SPM和Maximin-LinUCB,并建立类似的实例依赖对数遗憾界。

英文摘要:

Learning to play zero-sum games is a fundamental problem in game theory and machine learning. While significant progress has been made in minimizing external regret in the self-play settings or with full-information feedback, real-world applications often force learners to play against unknown, arbitrary opponents and restrict learners to bandit feedback where only the payoff of the realized action is observable. In such challenging settings, it is well-known that $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ external regret is unavoidable (where T is the number of rounds). To overcome this barrier, we investigate adversarial learning in zero-sum games under bandit feedback, aiming to minimize the deficit against the maximin pure strategy -- a metric we term Pure-Strategy Maximin Regret. We analyze this problem under two bandit feedback models: uninformed (only the realized reward is revealed) and informed (both the reward and the opponent's action are revealed). For uninformed bandit learning of normal-form games, we show that the Tsallis-INF algorithm achieves $O(c \log T)$ instance-dependent regret with a game-dependent parameter $c$. Crucially, we prove an information-theoretic lower bound showing that the dependence on c is necessary. To overcome this hardness, we turn to the informed setting and introduce Maximin-UCB, which obtains another regret bound of the form $O(c' \log T)$ for a different game-dependent parameter $c'$ that could potentially be much smaller than $c$. Finally, we generalize both results to bilinear games over an arbitrary, large action set, proposing Tsallis-FTRL-SPM and Maximin-LinUCB for the uninformed and informed setting respectively and establishing similar game-dependent logarithmic regret bounds.

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