We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee non-manipulability against strategic adversaries. The only computationally efficient algorithm for minimizing linear swap regret over a general convex set in $\mathbb{R}^d$ was developed recently by Daskalakis, Farina, Fishelson, Pipis, and Schneider (STOC '25). However, it incurs a highly suboptimal regret bound of $Ω(d^4 \sqrt{T})$ and also relies on computationally intensive calls to the ellipsoid algorithm at each iteration.
In this paper, we develop a significantly simpler, computationally efficient algorithm that guarantees $O(d \sqrt{T})$ linear swap regret for a general convex set that has been preconditioned via the John ellipsoid. Our algorithm leverages the powerful response-based approachability framework of Bernstein and Shimkin (JMLR~'15) -- previously overlooked in the line of work on swap regret minimization -- and simultaneously minimizes profile swap regret, which was recently shown to guarantee non-manipulability. Moreover, we establish a matching information-theoretic lower bound: any learner must incur in expectation $Ω(d \sqrt{T})$ linear swap regret for large enough $T$, even when the set is centrally symmetric. This also shows that the classic algorithm of Gordon, Greenwald, and Marks (ICML '08) is existentially optimal for minimizing linear swap regret, although it is computationally inefficient. Finally, we extend our approach to minimize regret with respect to the set of swap deviations with polynomial dimension, unifying and strengthening recent results in equilibrium computation and online learning.
Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to achieve better performance based on the accuracy of that estimator. In order to derive algorithms that achieve predictive Blackwell approachability, we start by showing a powerful connection between four well-known algorithms. Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) and online mirror descent (OMD) are the most prevalent regret minimizers in online convex optim…
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
The notion of approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs was introduced by Blackwell in the 1950s, along with geometric conditions for approachability and corresponding strategies that rely on computing {\em steering directions} as projections from the current average payoff vector to the (convex) target set. Recently, Abernethy, Batlett and Hazan (2011) proposed a class of approachability algorithms that rely on the no-regret properties of Online Linear Programming for computing a suitable sequence of steering directions. This is first carried out for target sets that are convex co…
Blackwell's celebrated approachability theory provides a general framework for a variety of learning problems, including regret minimization. However, Blackwell's proof and implicit algorithm measure approachability using the $\ell_2$ (Euclidean) distance. We argue that in many applications such as regret minimization, it is more useful to study approachability under other distance metrics, most commonly the $\ell_\infty$-metric. But, the time and space complexity of the algorithms designed for $\ell_\infty$-approachability depend on the dimension of the space of the vectorial payoffs, which i…
Israel Institute of Technology (Technion)（以色列理工学院）；Université Paris-Diderot（巴黎第七大学（巴黎狄德罗大学））；Ecole Normale Supérieure（巴黎高等师范学院）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；INRIA（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；HEC Paris（巴黎高等商学院）
Approachability has become a standard tool in analyzing earning algorithms in the adversarial online learning setup. We develop a variant of approachability for games where there is ambiguity in the obtained reward that belongs to a set, rather than being a single vector. Using this variant we tackle the problem of approachability in games with partial monitoring and develop simple and efficient algorithms (i.e., with constant per-step complexity) for this setup. We finally consider external regret and internal regret in repeated games with partial monitoring and derive regret-minimizing strat…
University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
We consider the celebrated Blackwell Approachability Theorem for two-player games with vector payoffs. We show that Blackwell's result is equivalent, via efficient reductions, to the existence of "no-regret" algorithms for Online Linear Optimization. Indeed, we show that any algorithm for one such problem can be efficiently converted into an algorithm for the other. We provide a useful application of this reduction: the first efficient algorithm for calibrated forecasting.
Chicago Booth School of Business（芝加哥大学布斯商学院）；MIT Sloan School of Management（麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院）；Google Research（谷歌研究院）
Motivated by online decision-making in time-varying combinatorial environments, we study the problem of transforming offline algorithms to their online counterparts. We focus on offline combinatorial problems that are amenable to a constant factor approximation using a greedy algorithm that is robust to local errors. For such problems, we provide a general framework that efficiently transforms offline robust greedy algorithms to online ones using Blackwell approachability. We show that the resulting online algorithms have $O(\sqrt{T})$ (approximate) regret under the full information setting. W…
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
Approachability theory, introduced by Blackwell (1956), provides fundamental results on repeated games with vector-valued payoffs, and has been usefully applied since in the theory of learning in games and to learning algorithms in the online adversarial setup. Given a repeated game with vector payoffs, a target set $S$ is approachable by a certain player (the agent) if he can ensure that the average payoff vector converges to that set no matter what his adversary opponent does. Blackwell provided two equivalent sets of conditions for a convex set to be approachable. The first (primary) condit…
Blackwell's approachability is a framework where two players, the Decision Maker and the Environment, play a repeated game with vector-valued payoffs. The goal of the Decision Maker is to make the average payoff converge to a given set called the target. When this is indeed possible, simple algorithms which guarantee the convergence are known. This abstract tool was successfully used for the construction of optimal strategies in various repeated games, but also found several applications in online learning. By extending an approach proposed by (Abernethy et al., 2011), we construct and analyze…
In online learning an algorithm plays against an environment with losses possibly picked by an adversary at each round. The generality of this framework includes problems that are not adversarial, for example offline optimization, or saddle point problems (i.e. min max optimization). However, online algorithms are typically not designed to leverage additional structure present in non-adversarial problems. Recently, slight modifications to well-known online algorithms such as optimism and adaptive step sizes have been used in several domains to accelerate online learning -- recovering optimal r…
We introduce the Conic Blackwell Algorithm$^+$ (CBA$^+$) regret minimizer, a new parameter- and scale-free regret minimizer for general convex sets. CBA$^+$ is based on Blackwell approachability and attains $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret. We show how to efficiently instantiate CBA$^+$ for many decision sets of interest, including the simplex, $\ell_{p}$ norm balls, and ellipsoidal confidence regions in the simplex. Based on CBA$^+$, we introduce SP-CBA$^+$, a new parameter-free algorithm for solving convex-concave saddle-point problems, which achieves a $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ ergodic rate of convergence. In ou…
Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed that if all agents in a multi-player general-sum normal-form game employ Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), the external regret of every player is $O(\textrm{polylog}(T))$ after $T$ repetitions of the game. We extend their result from external regret to internal regret and swap regret, thereby establishing uncoupled learning dynamics that converge to an approximate correlated equilibrium at the rate of $\tilde{O}(T^{-1})$. This substantially improves over the prior best rate of convergence for correlated equi…
University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学）；Rice University（莱斯大学）
We introduce a simple but general online learning framework in which a learner plays against an adversary in a vector-valued game that changes every round. Even though the learner's objective is not convex-concave (and so the minimax theorem does not apply), we give a simple algorithm that can compete with the setting in which the adversary must announce their action first, with optimally diminishing regret. We demonstrate the power of our framework by using it to (re)derive optimal bounds and efficient algorithms across a variety of domains, ranging from multicalibration to a large set of no …
A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed to render CFR tractable. Abstractions are often manually tuned, possibly removing important strategic differences in the full game and harming performance. Function approximation provides a natural solution to finding good abstractions to approximate the full game. A common approach to incorporating function approximation is to learn the inputs needed for a r…
In this paper, we develop new efficient projection-free algorithms for Online Convex Optimization (OCO). Online Gradient Descent (OGD) is an example of a classical OCO algorithm that guarantees the optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound. However, OGD and other projection-based OCO algorithms need to perform a Euclidean projection onto the feasible set $\mathcal{C}\subset \mathbb{R}^d$ whenever their iterates step outside $\mathcal{C}$. For various sets of interests, this projection step can be computationally costly, especially when the ambient dimension is large. This has motivated the developmen…
Efficient Swap Regret Minimization in Combinatorial Bandits
National Technical University of Athens（雅典国立技术大学）；National and Kapodistrian University of Athens（雅典国立卡波季斯特里安大学）；Archimedes, Athena Research Center（雅典娜研究中心阿基米德部）；Univ. Grenoble Alpes（格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；Grenoble INP（格勒诺布尔国立高等物理、数学与信息学院）；University of California, Irvine（加州大学尔湾分校）
Israel Institute of Technology (Technion)（以色列理工学院）；ENSAE ParisTech（巴黎高等经济与统计学院）；GREGHEC: HEC Paris — CNRS（GREGHEC：巴黎高等商学院——法国国家科学研究中心）
In the standard setting of approachability there are two players and a target set. The players play repeatedly a known vector-valued game where the first player wants to have the average vector-valued payoff converge to the target set which the other player tries to exclude it from this set. We revisit this setting in the spirit of online learning and do not assume that the first player knows the game structure: she receives an arbitrary vector-valued reward vector at every round. She wishes to approach the smallest ("best") possible set given the observed average payoffs in hindsight. This ex…
In this paper we establish efficient and \emph{uncoupled} learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in a general-sum multiplayer game, the \emph{swap regret} of each player after $T$ repetitions of the game is bounded by $O(\log T)$, improving over the prior best bounds of $O(\log^4 (T))$. At the same time, we guarantee optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$ swap regret in the adversarial regime as well. To obtain these results, our primary contribution is to show that when all players follow our dynamics with a \emph{time-invariant} learning rate, the \emph{second-order path lengths} of the dyna…
Testable and Actionable Calibration for Full Swap Regret
Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University（阿arhus大学计算机科学系）；Khoury College of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University（东北大学计算机科学学院）；Northeastern University（东北大学）
A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing algorithms require a number of samples exponential in the number of players to learn rationalizable equilibria under bandit feedback. This paper develops the first line of efficient algorithms for learning rationalizable Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE) and Correlated Equilibria (CE) whose sample complexities are polynomial in all problem parameters includ…
Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago（芝加哥丰田理工学院）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）
Online learning algorithms are designed to learn even when their input is generated by an adversary. The widely-accepted formal definition of an online algorithm's ability to learn is the game-theoretic notion of regret. We argue that the standard definition of regret becomes inadequate if the adversary is allowed to adapt to the online algorithm's actions. We define the alternative notion of policy regret, which attempts to provide a more meaningful way to measure an online algorithm's performance against adaptive adversaries. Focusing on the online bandit setting, we show that no bandit algo…
We study repeated two-player games where one of the players, the learner, employs a no-regret learning strategy, while the other, the optimizer, is a rational utility maximizer. We consider general Bayesian games, where the payoffs of both the optimizer and the learner could depend on the type, which is drawn from a publicly known distribution, but revealed privately to the learner. We address the following questions: (a) what is the bare minimum that the optimizer can guarantee to obtain regardless of the no-regret learning algorithm employed by the learner? (b) are there learning algorithms …
Regret has been established as a foundational concept in online learning, and likewise has important applications in the analysis of learning dynamics in games. Regret quantifies the difference between a learner's performance against a baseline in hindsight. It is well-known that regret-minimizing algorithms converge to certain classes of equilibria in games; however, traditional forms of regret used in game theory predominantly consider baselines that permit deviations to deterministic actions or strategies. In this paper, we revisit our understanding of regret from the perspective of deviati…
