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arXiv 2602.03455cs.MAcs.CCcs.GT
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在交叉成本下的多智能体路由的博弈论与算法分析

Game-Theoretic and Algorithmic Analyses of Multi-Agent Routing under Crossing Costs

Kyushu University(九州大学);Computer Science Institute, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University(查理大学数学物理学院计算机科学研究所);Nagoya University(名古屋大学)

Tesshu Hanaka, Nikolaos Melissinos, Hirotaka Ono

AI总结:

本文提出了一种基于交叉成本的多智能体路由模型,结合博弈论与算法分析,解决了去中心化协调中的拥堵和延迟问题。

摘要:

在共享网络上协调多个自主体的移动是算法机器人学、智能交通和分布式系统中的基本挑战。主流方法多智能体路径寻找依赖于集中控制和同步避障,通常需要严格的同步和全局无冲突执行的保证。本文引入了混合图上的多智能体路由在交叉成本模型,一种针对异步设置的新型框架。在我们的模型中,不像将冲突视为硬约束,每个智能体被分配一条路径,系统通过一个衡量潜在正面遭遇的代价函数进行评估。这种“交叉成本”,定义为穿越边的相反方向的智能体数量的乘积,量化了去中心化执行中的拥堵和延迟风险。我们的贡献既包括博弈论也包括算法方面。我们将该设定建模为一个具有非标准成本函数的拥堵游戏,证明了纯纳什均衡的存在,并分析导致它们的动力学。在温和条件下,均衡可以在多项式时间内找到,而一般情况是PLS完全的。从优化角度看,最小化总交叉成本是NP难的,因为该问题推广了Steiner定向。为了解决这一难度障碍,我们设计了一套参数化的算法来最小化交叉成本,参数包括弧数、边数、智能体数和结构图度量。这些结果根据参数的不同,产生XP或FPT结果,为结构受限实例提供算法策略。我们的框架为去中心化的多智能体路由提供了一个新的理论基础,将均衡分析与参数化复杂性结合,以支持可扩展且风险意识的协调。

英文摘要:

Coordinating the movement of multiple autonomous agents over a shared network is a fundamental challenge in algorithmic robotics, intelligent transportation, and distributed systems. The dominant approach, Multi-Agent Path Finding, relies on centralized control and synchronous collision avoidance, which often requires strict synchronization and guarantees of globally conflict-free execution. This paper introduces the Multi-Agent Routing under Crossing Cost model on mixed graphs, a novel framework tailored to asynchronous settings. In our model, instead of treating conflicts as hard constraints, each agent is assigned a path, and the system is evaluated through a cost function that measures potential head-on encounters. This ``crossing cost'', which is defined as the product of the numbers of agents traversing an edge in opposite directions, quantifies the risk of congestion and delay in decentralized execution. Our contributions are both game-theoretic and algorithmic. We model the setting as a congestion game with a non-standard cost function, prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria, and analyze the dynamics leading to them. Equilibria can be found in polynomial time under mild conditions, while the general case is PLS-complete. From an optimization perspective, minimizing the total crossing cost is NP-hard, as the problem generalizes Steiner Orientation. To address this hardness barrier, we design a suite of parameterized algorithms for minimizing crossing cost, with parameters including the number of arcs, edges, agents, and structural graph measures. These yield XP or FPT results depending on the parameter, offering algorithmic strategies for structurally restricted instances. Our framework provides a new theoretical foundation for decentralized multi-agent routing, bridging equilibrium analysis and parameterized complexity to support scalable and risk-aware coordination.

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