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arXiv 2601.00577cs.LG

对抗样本并非皆相同

Adversarial Samples Are Not Created Equal

Scale AI;CrowdStrike;EleutherAI

Jennifer Crawford, Amol Khanna, Fred Lu, Amy R. Wagoner, Stella Biderman, Andre T. Nguyen, Edward Raff

AI总结:

本文提出对抗样本分为两种类型,通过集成度量方法分析其构成,重新审视对抗鲁棒性相关现象。

摘要:

在过去十年中,已有大量理论被提出以解释深度神经网络对对抗逃逸攻击的广泛脆弱性。其中,Ilyas等人提出的非鲁棒特征理论被广泛接受,表明数据分布中易碎但具有预测性的特征可以被攻击者直接利用。然而,这一理论忽略了那些不直接利用这些特征的对抗样本。在本文中,我们主张这两种样本——那些利用易碎但具有预测性的特征的样本,以及那些不利用的样本——构成了两种类型的对抗弱点,在评估对抗鲁棒性时应加以区分。为此,我们提出了一种基于集成的度量方法,用于衡量对抗扰动对非鲁棒特征的操控,并利用该度量方法分析攻击者生成的对抗样本的构成。这一新视角也使我们能够重新审视多个现象,包括锐度感知最小化对对抗鲁棒性的影响,以及在鲁棒数据集上对抗训练与标准训练之间观察到的鲁棒性差距。

英文摘要:

Over the past decade, numerous theories have been proposed to explain the widespread vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial evasion attacks. Among these, the theory of non-robust features proposed by Ilyas et al. has been widely accepted, showing that brittle but predictive features of the data distribution can be directly exploited by attackers. However, this theory overlooks adversarial samples that do not directly utilize these features. In this work, we advocate that these two kinds of samples - those which use use brittle but predictive features and those that do not - comprise two types of adversarial weaknesses and should be differentiated when evaluating adversarial robustness. For this purpose, we propose an ensemble-based metric to measure the manipulation of non-robust features by adversarial perturbations and use this metric to analyze the makeup of adversarial samples generated by attackers. This new perspective also allows us to re-examine multiple phenomena, including the impact of sharpness-aware minimization on adversarial robustness and the robustness gap observed between adversarially training and standard training on robust datasets.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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