和平对话与冲突陷阱
Peace Talk and Conflict Traps
AI总结:
该研究构建安全困境的世代交叠模型,分析成本高昂的赛前沟通对冲突的影响,发现信号传递可降低冲突爆发风险,公开性会导致和平或冲突陷阱,并探讨秘密渠道与公开承诺的政策选择。
摘要:
成本高昂的赛前沟通可以阻止不必要的战争,但一旦暴力爆发,同样的沟通也可能陷入僵局。我们构建了一个安全困境的世代交叠模型,包含持续的群体类型(正常型与不良型)、当前老年群体向当前年轻群体的单侧私人信号传递,以及对上一次互动的嘈杂私人记忆。我们刻画了一个平稳均衡:在信号成本处于中间区间时,正常型老年群体仅在拥有令人担忧的私人历史后,才会混合发送成本高昂的安抚信号;该信号因内生接收者阈值和不良型的策略性模仿而保持微弱的说服力。信号传递严格降低了冲突爆发的风险;在私人模型中,冲突爆发后的持续时间不变,但当存在小概率的公开性(泄密)导致和解失败的公开记录后,持续时间会增加。在公开性条件下,博弈通常会陷入和平陷阱或冲突陷阱。我们讨论了福利与政策:何时应优先选择秘密渠道而非公开承诺。
英文摘要:
Costly pre-play messages can deter unnecessary wars - but the same messages can also entrench stalemates once violence begins. We develop an overlapping-generations model of a security dilemma with persistent group types (normal vs bad), one-sided private signaling by the current old to the current young, and noisy private memory of the last encounter. We characterize a stationary equilibrium in which, for an intermediate band of signal costs, normal old agents mix on sending a costly reassurance only after an alarming private history; the signal is kept marginally persuasive by endogenous receiver cutoffs and strategic mimicking by bad types. Signaling strictly reduces the hazard of conflict onset; conditional on onset, duration is unchanged in the private model but increases once a small probability of publicity (leaks) creates a public record of failed reconciliation. With publicity, play generically absorbs in a peace trap or a conflict trap. We discuss welfare and policy: when to prefer back-channels versus public pledges.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。