冲突升级中的信息效应
Informational Effects in Conflict Escalation
- University of Glasgow（格拉斯哥大学）
- The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem（希伯来大学费德曼理性研究中心）
- Lancaster University（兰开斯特大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
本文研究消耗战中信息对冲突升级的影响，发现对称情形下改善双方信息可提高和平概率与效用，而更高利益则相反；不对称时单方信息改进可能不利。
AI中文摘要：
我们研究了一场消耗战，其中每一方都选择在让步之前升级到何种程度。如果双方在升级达到一个随机的灾难阈值之前都不让步，则双方都将一无所获；否则，对抗将以和平方式结束。当双方事前对称且其收益相互独立时，改善双方关于自身利益的私人信息会同时提高和平的概率以及每一方的事前均衡效用。该结果对后验价值（即每一方在给定其私人信息下获胜的预期收益）的每一个非平凡均值保持展形都成立。更高的利益则起相反作用：后验价值的一阶随机增加会导致更大的坚持性，降低和平的概率，并可能降低双方的事前效用。从对称状态出发，仅改善一方信息的足够小的改进也能促进和平；其一阶效应恰好是改善双方信息时效应的一半。然而，在不对称的起点上，即使是一方的小幅单向改进也可能反而降低和平的概率。
英文摘要：
We study a war of attrition in which each party chooses how far to escalate before conceding. If neither concedes before escalation reaches a random disaster threshold, both receive nothing; otherwise the confrontation ends peacefully. When the parties are ex-ante symmetric and their benefits are independent, improving both parties' private information about their own stakes raises both the probability of peace and each party's ex-ante equilibrium utility. The result holds for every nontrivial mean-preserving spread of posterior values---each party's expected benefit from prevailing given its private information. Higher stakes work in the opposite direction: a first-order stochastic increase in posterior values induces greater persistence, lowers the probability of peace, and can reduce both parties' ex-ante utilities. Starting from symmetry, a sufficiently small improvement in only one party's information also promotes peace; its first-order effect is exactly half that of improving both parties' information. At an asymmetric starting point, however, even a small one-sided improvement can instead lower the probability of peace.
