均衡中的分类:最优决策规则的结构
Classification in Equilibrium: Structure of Optimal Decision Rules
AI总结:
本文研究了在均衡条件下最优分类规则的结构,发现最优规则属于单阈值和双切割规则,能够最大化全局准确性并提高信息质量。
摘要:
本文研究了当个体根据分类规则调整行为时最优分类的特性。我们将设计者与人群的互动建模为一个Stackelberg博弈:设计者选择一个分类规则,预估个体将如何遵守、作弊或 abstain 以获得有利的分类。在标准的单调似然比假设下,以及对于一般的分类目标集,最优规则属于一个小而可解释的家族——单阈值和双切割规则——涵盖了传统和反直觉的设计。我们的结果与先前发现的最优分类器奖励更高信号的结果有显著差异。在均衡中,全局准确性可以通过奖励较低的似然比或集中奖励或惩罚在中间带以提高信息质量来最大化。我们进一步刻画了分类目标,这些目标排除了对某些人群产生社会有害均衡的规则,这些规则会抑制合规性。
英文摘要:
This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a classification rule anticipating how individuals will comply, cheat, or abstain in order to obtain a favorable classification. Under standard monotone likelihood ratio assumptions, and for a general set of classification objectives, optimal rules belong to a small and interpretable family--single-threshold and two-cut rules--that encompass both conventional and counterintuitive designs. Our results depart sharply from prior findings that optimal classifiers reward higher signals. In equilibrium, global accuracy can be maximized by rewarding those with lower likelihood ratios or by concentrating rewards or penalties in a middle band to improve informational quality. We further characterize classification objectives that rule out socially harmful equilibria that disincentivize compliance for some populations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。